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CORPORATIONS AND EXPRESS TRUSTS
AS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS?“
Advantages’ Claimed.
PRESIDENT
BUTLER of Columbia University is reported to
have said in an address before the New York Chamber of
Commerce in I911, that “the limited liability corporation is the
greatest single discovery of modern times, whether you judge it by
its social, by its ethical, by its industrial, or, in the long run—
after we understand it and know how to use it,-—by its political,
effects.“
In 1912, in a paper submitted to the Tax Commissioner of Massa
chusetts, Alfred D. CHANDLER, of the Boston Bar, said “Express
Trusts, whether created under wills, deeds of settlement, assign
ments _for the benefit of creditors, receiverships, or by special dec
larations of trust, to manage property or carry on business, are
neither corporations nor joint stock companies, nor partnerships,
but they employ a distinct and the highest known method of admin
istration.””
The latest Statistical Abstract shows that in 1913, there were in
the United States 305,336 corporations, with over $96,000,000,000
of stock and bonds, with an income of over $3,800,o0o,000, and pay
ing a tax to the Federal government of over $35,000,000. The
stock and bonds together represent nearly or quite two thirds of
the wealth of the whole country. In 4 years, 1909-1913, the number
of corporations increased over 40,000, and the stock and bonds over
$12,ooo,oo0,o0o.“
" Address before the North Dakota State Bar Association, Sept. 17, 1914.
‘The Government and the Corporations, by Francis Lynde Stetson, no At]. M.,
p. 27, 32 (July, 1912) quoting from Pres. Butler.
‘Express Trusts under the Common Law, by Alfred Chandler, p. 26. Little,
Brown & Co. 1912.
‘United States Statistical Abstract, 1913, p. 600.
§‘
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In conservative Massachusetts in the five years, 1907-1911, about
6,500 corporations were created; and during the same period over
4,000 were dissolved by the legislature. In 1911, it was reported
that 4,000 California corporations would be dissolved for failure to
pay a license tax, and 4,000 more in Missouri for failure to file the
annual anti-trust statement. This shows an extraordinary mortality
among corporations in these states."
In 1912, Express Real Estate Trusts in Boston alone owned
$250,000,000 of property and there had been no deaths among 17 of
them in 14 years."
In 1905, President SIMMONs of the Fourth National Bank in
New York, and of the New York Stock Exchange, said: “The exten
sion of the principle of incorporation has enabled leaders in business
to set up two standards of morality, to maintain a Jekyll and Hyde
duality, and to do as members of an impersonal and non-moral cor
porate body acts which they would shrink from as individuals. In
private life they are stainless, but in the interests of corporations,
* * * they will have recourse to every villainy damned in the
decalogue.” And in 1910, President WILSON, in his address be
fore the American Bar Association pleaded “earnestly for the indi
vidualization of responsibility within the corporation, for the estab
lishment of the principle of law that a man has no more right to
do wrong as a member of a corporation than as an individual.”
On the other hand to quote MAITLAND, “It is said—and appeal is
made to long experience,—that men are more conscientious when
they are doing acts in their own names than when they are using the
name of a corporation.” “A very high degree not only of honesty,
but of diligence has been required of trustees.” “No higher stand
ards of administrative conduct are evoked by Courts than those
which trusts require.”
Special Advantages of Corporations.
The advantages of incorporation have long been recognized and
frequently referred to in the literature of our law. More than six
hundred years ago, BRACTON said: “If an abbot, or prior * * *
* Chandler, Express Trusts, p. 10, and Supplement.
* Report of Tax Commissioner (Wm. D. T. Trefry), Mass. 1912, p. 18. Chandler,
Express Trusts, p. 11.
* As quoted by Chandler, Express Trusts, p. 20, from the New York Daily Tribune,
Oct. 7, 1905.
* The Lawyer and the Community, Am. Bar Assn. Rep., 1910, pp. 419, 438.
* Maitland, Trust & Corporation, Collected Papers, Vol. III, p. 362.
* Ib., p. 352.
* Chandler Express Trusts, p. 24.
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claim land in the name of their church upon the seisin of their pre
decessors * * * the declaration should not be from abbot to abbot,
or prior to prior, nor should there be mention of the intermediate
abbots or priors, because in colleges and in chapters the same cor
poration always remains, although they all die successively and
others are substituted in their place, as may be said of flocks of
sheep, where there is always the same flock, although all the
sheep or heads successively depart, nor does any individual of them
succeed to another by right of succession in such manner that the
right descends by inheritance from one to another, because the
right always pertains to the church, and remains with the church.
* * And accordingly if the abbot or the prior, the monks or
canons successively die, the house remains to eternity.”“
BLACKSTONE writing five centuries later than BRACTON, and at the
very beginning of the application of science and invention to indus
trial conditions, in anything like modern ways, says in summing up
the corporation law of his time :—
"To show the advantages of these incorporations, let us consider
the case of a college in either of our universities, founded ad stu
dendum et orandum, for the encouragement and support of relig
ion and learning. If this were a mere voluntary assembly, the
individuals which compose it might indeed read, pray, study, and
perform scholastic exercises together, so long as they could agree
to do so; but they neither frame, nor receive any laws or rules of
of their conduct; none at least which would have any binding force,
for want of coercive power to create a sufficient obligation. Neither
could they be capable of retaining any privileges or immunities;
for, if such privileges be attacked, which of all this unconnected
assembly has the right, or ability, to defend them? And, when
they are dispersed by death or otherwise, how shall they transfer
these advantages to another set of students, equally unconnected
as themselves? So, also, with regard to holding estates or other
property, if land be granted for the purposes of religion or learning
to twenty individuals not incorporated, there is no legal way of con
tinuing the property to any other persons for the same purposes,
but by endless-conveyances from one to the other, as often as the
hands are changed. But when they are consolidated and united into
a corporation, they and their successors are then considered as one
jrerson in law; as one person, they have one will, which is collected
from the sense of the majority of the individuals; this one will may
establish rules and orders for the regulations of the whole, which
" Bracton, Treatise on Laws of England, (c. 1264), Vol. 5, Twiss’s Ed., pp. 447-449.
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are a sort of municipal laws of this little republic; or rules and
statutes may be prescribed to it at its creation, which are then in the
place of natural laws; the privileges and immunities, the estates and
possessions, of the corporation, when once vested in them, will be
forever vested, without any new conveyance to new successions; for
all the individual members that have existed from the foundation to
the present time, or that shall ever hereafter exist, are but one person
in law, a person that never dies; in like manner as the river Thames
is still the same river, though the parts which compose it are chang
ing every instant.” -
In 1819 Chief Justice MARSHALL put it this way: “A corporation
is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in con
templation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only
those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it
.
either expressly o
r
a
s
incidental to it
s very existence. These are
such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which
it was created. Among the most important are immortality, and,
if the expression may be allowed, individuality: properties b
y
which
a perpetual succession o
f many persons are considered as the same,
and may act as a single, individual. They enable a corporation to
manage its own affairs and to hold property without the perplexing
intricacies, the hazardous and endless necessity o
f perpetual convey
ances for the purpose o
f transmitting it from hand to hand. It is
chiefly for the purpose o
f clothing the bodies o
f
men in succession
with those qualities and capacities that corporations were invented
and are in use. By these means a perpetual succession o
f
individuals
are capable o
f acting for the promotion o
f
the particular object, like
one immortal being.”
Special Advantages o
f Express Trusts.
Upon the other hand the special advantages o
f Express Trusts
have recently been stated a
s follows:"
(1) These associations have been found b
y
the experience o
f
twenty-five years to be a convenient, safe and unobjectionable meth
od o
f coöperative ownership and management.
(2) The form o
f organization ensures a continuity o
f manage
ment and control which appeals strongly to investors in real estate,
which cannot be secured b
y
a corporation with changing officers.
The trustees who are the managing officers o
f
a trust are not so
likely to be changed as are the directors o
f
a corporation.
* Blackstone, Commentaries, (1765), Ch. 18, Of Corporations.
* Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, (1819), 4 Wheat. (17 U. S.) 518.
* Report of Tax Commissioner of Mass., 1912, p. 21.
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(3) It affords a more economical and more convenient and flex
ible form of management than does a corporation. Trustees can
transact business with more ease and rapidity than directors.
“In the early development of uses a device was struck upon that
gave permanence as well as relief from the various feudal burdens.
This was the joint tenancy. An owner will convey his land to a
party of friends, to hold as joint tenants. “There will then be no
inheritance, and no relief, wardship, marriage. By keeping up the
wall of joint tenants, by feoffment and refeoffment, he can keep
out the lord and can reduce the chances of reliefs and so forth to
nothing.” There is here no inheritance, only accrescence."
Mr. MATLAND names “a few typical instances of unincorporated
bodies” that have lived behind the trustee wall for long periods of
years.” He says “Imagine a foreign tourist, with Baedeker in hand
visiting one of our ‘Inns of Court, let us say Lincoln's Inn. He
sees the chapel and the library and the dining hall; he sees the ex
ternal gates that are shut at night. * * * On inquiring he hears of
an ancient constitution that had taken shape before 1422. * * * You
have here a Privateverein which has not even juristic personality.
* * * Its members might divide the property that is held for them
by trustees. * * * The English judges who received and repeated
a great deal of the canonistic learning about corporations * * *
were to a man members of these * * * and had never found that
the want of juristic personality was a serious misfortune."
Then there are (or were until 6 weeks ago) the ships of Com
merce carrying the name of Lloyds into all the seas of the world;
almost from the beginning there was among these insurers of the
world's commerce only a very loose organization with the exclusive
use of a coffee house, and a small trust fund, until the trust deed
of 1811 was executed with over 1,100 signatures, and until 1871
“it was an unincorporated Verein, without the least trace (at least
so we said) of juristic personality about it.” It was incorporated
in 1871, because in that year there was recovered from the Zuyder
Zee, a large mass of treasure that had been lying there since 1799,
and, because of the destruction of records by fire, it belonged to no
one could say whom.”
There is also the London Stock Exchange, beginning in 1773 when
the name was “wrote over the door” at New Johnathan's Coffee
House. “In 1802 a costly site was bought, a costly building erected,
* Maitland, Lectures on Equity, p. 26.
* Maitland, Trust & Corporation, Collected Papers, Vol. III, p. 336.
* Maitland, Trust & Corporation, Collected Papers, Vol. III, p. 369-371.
* Ib. pp. 371-373.
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and an elaborate constitution was formulated in “a deed of settle
ment." There was a capital of £20,000 divided into 400 shares. Be
hind the trustees stood a body of “proprietors,” who had found the
money; and behind the “proprietors” stood a much larger body of
“members” whose subscriptions formed the income that was divided
among the “proprietors.” “In I876 there was a new deed of settle
ment; in I882 large changes were made in it: there was a capital of
£240,000 divided into 20,000 shares. * * * The organization is of
a high type. * * * In I877 a Royal Commission * * * recommend
ed that the Stock Exchange should be incorporated,” and the bye
laws~be made subject to the approval of the Board of Trade. “That
was the Cloven hoof. Ex [Jede diabolum.” It was not incorporated,
yet l\/IAITLAND says: “it would not, I think, be easy to find anything
that a corporation could do that is not being done by this nicht
rec/1tsfdhigc Verein” (society without legal capacity)?° The New
York Stock Exchange also is unincorporated.
MAITLAND, with his delightful humor, says again: “I believe that
in the eyes of a large number of my fellow countrymen, the most
important and august tribunal in England is not the House of
Lords but the Jockey Club. * * * Some gentlemen form a club,
buy a race course, the famous Newmarket Heath, which is con
veyed to trustees for them, and then they can say who shall and
who shall not be admitted to it. I fancy, however, that some men
who have been excluded from this sacred heath (“warned off New
Market Heath” is our phrase), would have much preferred the
major excommunication of that “historic organism” the Church of
Rome.””°
This reference to the Church justifies further quotation from
MAITLAND. He says “All that we English people mean by “religious
liberty" has been intimately connected with the making of trusts.
* * * If in I688 the choice had lain between conceding no tolera
tion at all and forming corporations of Nonconformists,” they
would have been “Untolerated for a long time to come, for in Eng
land, as elsewhere, incorporation meant privilege and exceptional
favour. And, on the other hand, there were among the Noncon—
formists many who would have thought that even toleration was
dearly purchased if their religious affairs were subjected to State
control. * * * If the State could be persuaded * * * to repeal a
few persecuting laws * * * Trust would do the rest * * *. Trust
soon did the rest. * * * And now we have in England Iewish Syn
agogues and Catholic cathedrals and the churches and chapels of
"1b- on 373-376
”Ib. p. 376.
_ __ff _ i é E _* _ _i_ ii *1---4
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countless sects. They are owned by natural persons. They are
owned by trustees.”
In this way were the lands of the Methodist churches and chapels
held throughout England and the United States, under model deeds
used by John Wesley in the very beginning of his ministry to the
effect that the trustees, for the time being should permit Wesley
himself, and such other persons as he might, from time to time ap
point, to have the free use of such premises, to preach therein God's
holy word, and after his death “for the sole use of such persons as
might be appointed by the yearly conference;” these deeds were
confirmed and made perpetual under his deed of trust of 1784, es
tablishing the Methodist General Conference of IOO, and which has
been called the Magna Charta of that church.”
And although our Supreme Court has recently held, following
the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, that the Roman Cath
olic Church is a corporation “which antedates by almost a thousand
years any other personality in Europe,” yet the great “organized
operative institution” known as the Established Church of England,
tracing its existence back to Theodore of Tarsus, 669 A. D. “is not
a corporate body.”
It would seem from these illustrations, that other institutions
known to the law based upon trusteeships rival in duration and per
manence the immortality of corporations.
It is my purpose to compare these two-Corporations and Ex
press Trusts,—in such detail as my time will permit, to discover, if
perchance we may, something of the strength and weakness of each,
for business purposes, under present day conditions.
Theory of Corporate Existence.”
A recent definition by Chief Justice BALDw1N of the Connecticut
Supreme Court, says a corporation is “an association of persons to
whom the sovereign has offered a franchise to become an artificial,
* Ib. pp. 363-364.
* Life and Times of John Wesley. by L. Tyerman, Vol. 3, p. 419; Lost Chapters
from Early History of American Methodism, by J. B. Wakeley, p. 58, where a copy of
the deed for a Methodist Preaching-house, on John Street, N. Y., dated Nov. 2, 1770,
is given.
* Tyerman, p. 421.
* Barlin v. Ramirez (1906), 7 Phil. 41; Ponce v. Roman Catholic Church (1908),
21o U. S. 296; Santos v. Roman Catholic Church (1909), 212 U. S. 463.
* 3 Encyc. of Laws of England, p. 14; 2 Stephen’s Commentaries, 16th Ed. (1914),
p. 806; 11 Halsbury's The Laws of England, p. 371, Sec. 706 (Ecclesiastical Law).
* Bibliography:
Angell and Ames, Law of Private Corporations, Introduction and Ch. I. (1st Ed.
1831, and subsequent editions.)
Baldwin, S. E., History of the Law of Private Corporations in the Colonies and
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States, Yale Bicen. Pub. 1901, p. 261, 3 Select Essays, Anglo-Am. Legal Hist., p. 236;
Freedom of Incorporation, (in Modern Political Institutions, 1898).
Blackstone, Sir Wm., Commentaries (1765), Bk. I, Ch. xviii.
Brissaud, J., History of French Private Law, Continental Legal History Series,
(1912). P9- 889-905
Brown, W. Jethro, The Austinian Theory of Law, (1906), pp. 254-270; The Per
sonality of the Corporation and the State, 21 Law Quart. Rev. 365.
Carr, Cecil Thomas, Early Forms of Corporateness. Ch. IX, in General Principles
of the Law of Corporations, 3 Select Essays, Anglo-Am. Legal Hist. (1905), p. 161;
Select Charters of Trading Companies, 1530-1707. Selden Society, Vol. 28 (1913).
Cawston and Keane, The Early Chartered Companies, 1296-1858, (1896).
Clark and Marshall, Private Corporations, Vol. I, Ch. I.
Davis, John P., Corporations, A Study of Origin and Development, (1905); Nature
of Corporations, 12 Polit. Science Quar. 273.
Deiser, George F., The Juristic Person, 57 Am. Law Reg. (O. S.) 131, (1908).
Elliot, C. B., Private Corporations, Ch. I, (1897).
Evans, F., The Evolution of the English Joint Stock Trading Company, 8 Colum
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Kyd, S., Corporations (1793), Introduction.
Macheu, A. W. Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 Harv. Law Rev., (1911), pp. 253, 347.
Maitland, F. Wt, The Crown as Corporation, 3 Coll. Pap. pp. 244-270; The Unin
corporated Body, Ib., pp. 271-284; The Body Politic, Ib., pp. 285-303; Moral Person
ality and Legal Personality, Ib., pp. 304-320; Trust and Corporation, Ib., pp. 321-404.
See also 14 Journal Comp. Leg., p. 192.
Manson E, Evolution of the Private Company, 26 Law Quart. Rev., pp. 11-16.
Merritt, W. W., Some Views of the Nature and Efiect of Corporateness, 10 Mich.
Law Rev., p. 310 (1912).
Miraglia, Luigi, Comparative Legal Philosophy, (Vol. III, Modern Legal Philos
ophy Series, tr. by John Lisle, 1912), Ch. III, Incorporeal Persons, pp. 361-381.
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Rein (1909), PP- 45-8!
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Pollock, Sir F., Contracts, 6th Ed., 108; 7th Ed., 113; Has the Common Law Re
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juridical person, with a name of its own, under which they can act
and contract, and sue and be sued, and who have accepted the offer
and effected an organization in substantial conformity with its
terms.””’
There are three fundamental ideas l1ere: A corporation is -a new
person in the law resulting from the acceptance of a franchise to
become such, by an association of persons.
The first of these,—that a corporation is a person,“ separate from
its members, has already been referred to as its chief characteristic
and advantage. This idea of the personality and unity of a group
is not new but old, almost as old as language. We are told nowa
days that the primitive mind of man had a more definite and positive
idea of the unity and solidarity of the horde, or pack, or clan or
tribe of savage hunters and warriors, than it had of the personality
of its individual members.”
Among all the Aryan peoples,—Hindu, Greek, Roman, Teuton,
or Slav,—the oldest artificial person seems to have been the fam
ily.“ The Ancient Egyptians and Babylonians personified the Tem
ple.“ Long before JUSTINIAN all the members of a corporation were
considered one person or body in the Roman Law.”
The canonists of the 13th century call it a persona ficta, not
found in the world of sense, but created by law, invisible, immortal,
a body that has no body and no soul; it cannot sin, or be excom
Sutton’s Hospital Case, 10 Coke Rep., pp. 1-35 (1613).
Taylor, I-I. O., Private Corporations, Prelaces, and Chs. I-IV. (1884 and subse
quent editions).
Trapnell, Benj., The Logical Conception of a Corporation, West Virginia Bar
Assn. Report 1896, Appendix to Clark on Corporations, 1st Ed., p. 643. ,
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518.
Wilgus, H. L., Corporation Cases, pp. 1-167 with notes (1900).
Williston, Samuel, History of the Law of Business Corporations before 1800, 2
Harv. Law Rev., 105, 149 (1888), 3 Select Essays Anglo-Am. Legal Hist. p. 195.
Wormser, I. M., Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity (1912), 12 Col. Law Rev.
496.
Wright, A. G., The California State Tax on Corporate Franchises, 1 Cal. Law Rev.
91. (1913).
Young. E. H., Legal Personality of a Foreign Corporation, 22 Law Quart. Rev.
178 (1906). Foreign Companies and Other Corporations, Cambridge University Press,
1912.
(The foregoing bibliography includes only such works as contain important matter
relating to corporate theory or history.)
"Mackay v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. (1909), 82 Conn. 73, 81, 72 Atl. 583.
“See particularly in bibliography given in note 26 above, Blackstone. Brissaud,
Brown, Carr, Deiser, Freund, Geldart, Gierke, Machen, Maitland, Miraglia, Pike, Pol
lock, Salmond, Seymour, Sohm, Wilgus.
"Morawetz, § 1, p. 2.
"Hearn, The Aryan Household, pp. 64-6.
"Johns, C. H. W., Babylonian & Assyrian Laws, Contracts & Letters, Ch. XX
(1904); Simcox, E. J., Primitive Civilizations, Vol. I, pp. 171-179." Amos, Sheldon, History and Principles of Civil Law of Rome, p. 118.
municated, nor commit a crime, and probably not a tort.“ Early in
the 14th century these words were being repeated in the year books
of English law by the English judges. In I311 it was considered
a body (un corps), existing per se, and not appendant or appurte
nant to something else.“ And only a short time ago Mr. Justice
MCKENNA, of the United State Supreme Court said “Undoubtedly
a corporation is in law, a person or entity entirely distinct from its
stockholders and officers.”‘“‘ It is such, for the most part, in rela
tion to outside parties; it has rights of property and reputation, and
is subject to general duties under the common law and statutes;
and is also considered a person as to ownership of property, and
suing and being sued, and in considerable measure it is so under
the protection of constitutional and treaty provisions.“
The second of these,—that a corporation results from the accept
ance of a franchise“ from the state,—although now so frequently
criticized or belittled, historically has been as important as the per
sonality of the corporation. In fact in legal theory, the privilege,
the franchise itself, is the capacity of separate personality, conferred
upon the group. The legal ideas involved come from the Roman
and from the Feudal law. From the Roman, the franchise is a priv
ilege of a public nature conferred by the state for political or public
reasons. Anciently perhaps in Greece and Rome groups of per
sons were associated without authority of the state, and acted much
as a single person; but the Romans were jealous of such and many
laws were made against illicit companies between the Twelve Tables
(450 B. C.) and the Empire; Caesar and Augustus did the same;
and in the time of Gaius, and Marcian, corporations could be cre
ated only under special or general legislative authority."
The same Political theory of corporate existence prevailed in the
middle ages. “The corporation is and must be the creature of the
state. Into its nostrils the state must breathe the breath of fictitious
life, for otherwise it would be no animated body but individualistic
dust.”3" In the Year Books of our law in I376, it was ruled that
5‘ Pollock & Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, p. 477. Note Wilgus’s Cases, pp. 72-79.
5‘ Y. B., 4 Ed. II, 103; Y. B., 16 Ed. III; Pike's Introduction.
"McCaskill Co. v. U. S. (1910), 216 U. S. 504, 514. And Cave, _T., In re Shefiield
etc. Society (1889), says “A corporation is a legal person just as much as an individual."
L. R. 22 Q. B. D. 470 on 476.
“See Cases, Wilgus, Corp. Cases, pp. 33-72.
“See bibliography in note 26 above, particularly, Blackstone. Gierke, (Maitland’s
tr. Introduc., pp. xxxi-xxxviii), Kent, State Trials, Trustees Dart. Coll. v. Woodward
(Washington‘s Opinion), Wilgus, (Corp. Cases, pp. 113-170), Wright.
"Kent, Comm., Vol. 2, pp. 268-9; Taylor's El. Civil Law, pp. 567-57:; Digest,
xlvii, 22, 1 and 3 (Marcian); Digest, iii, 4, 1 (Gains).
3“Maitland's Summary, in Gierke's Pol. Th. of Mid. Ages, p. xxx.
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“none but the king can make a corporation.” And as we all know
with us today “the right to form a private corporation can only be
acquired from the state.”
From the Feudal law this privilege was not merely a personal priv
ilege, but was looked upon as a privilege of a property kind. The
Medieval mind had a peculiar tendency to look upon all sorts of
immaterial or incorporeal things and privileges as property; as for
example, the right of advowson. Feudal rights and incidents, too
intangible to be called holdings, were yet considered property in the
Medieval law.” In 1691 it was said “the whole frame and essence
of the corporation consist” of the franchises which are “the liga
ments of this body politic.” CoMYNs says in 1740, “A corporation
is a franchise created by the king.” BLACKSTONE and KENT say the
same. Such a view is not dead nor sleepeth yet. It was the real
basis of Mr. Justice WASHINGTON's decision in the Dartmouth Col
lege case." In 1887, Mr. Justice BRADLEY said: “A franchise is a
right of public concern. * * * No persons can make themselves a
body corporate and politic without legislative authority. Corporate
capacity is a franchise.” Ten years ago the Supreme Court of
California said “The right to be and exist as a corporation is a
grant by the sovereign power, a valuable right” and subject to taxa
tion." And just the other day it was said: “A corporate franchise
is the right to exist as an entity for the purpose of doing things per
mitted by law.” And the exercise of such right is subject to taxa
tion.*
The third of these, -that a corporation is really an association or
collection of individuals, is strongly insisted upon by Mr. Morawetz
and Mr. Taylor. Mr. Morawetz says: It is “essential to bear in mind
distinctly that the rights and duties of an incorporated association,
are in reality, the rights and duties of the persons who compose it
,
not o
f
a
n imaginary being.” And Mr. Taylor: There are “two
* Y. B., 49 Ed. III, 17.
* People v. Mackey (1912), 255 Ill. 144, 156, 99 N. E. 37o.
* McKechnie, Magna Carta, pp. 383-4.
* King v. London, Carthew, 217; 1 Show. 275-6.
*4 Wheat. 518 on 657, (1819).
* California v. Central Pacific Ry. Co., 127 U. S. 1, 40.
*Bank of California v. City & Co. of San Francisco (1904), 142 Cal. 276, 1oo Am.
St. R
. 130, 75 Pac. 832; Crocker v
. Scott, 149 Cal. 575, 8
7
Pac. 89; Western Union
Oil Co. v. Los Angeles (1911), 161 Cal. 204, 118 Pac. 721; Farr Alpaca Co. v. Commw.
(1912), 212 Mass. 156. Compare Detroit &c. Ry. Co. v
.
Common Council (1901), 125
Mich. 673, 84 Am. St. R
. 589, 85 N. W. 96; Blackrock Copper Min. Co. v. Tingey
(1908), 34 Utah 369, 98 Pac. 18o; Cooper v
.
Utah Light &c. Co. (1909), 35 Utah, 570,
1 oz Pac. 202. See 1 Cal. Law Rev. 9
1
(1913).
* State v. Business Men's Assn. (1914), — Mo. App., -, 163 S. W. 901.
* People v. Sohmer (1914), 147 N. Y. S. 611.
* Morawetz Private Corp. 2d Ed. Preface and §§ 227-231; See Note Wilgus Cases,
p. 110.
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meanings of the term corporation; the one, the sum of legal rela
tions subsisting in respect to the corporate enterprise; the other the
organic body of shareholders, whose acts cause the operation of the
rules of law in the constitution. These two conceptions include
all that is really connoted by the term in whatever sense used. And,
if so, what has become of the venerable ‘legal person’? Is he still
somewhere, as he has aways been imagined? Or is he nowhere as
he has always actually been? Shall we say he is the combination,
the mystic unification of our two conceptions? Better not; better
forget l1im."5°
Tlneory of the Trust.“
Trusts of course are the creation of the English courts of
equity. As MA1T1.ANo says, “Of all the exploits of equity the
largest and most important is the invention and development of the
'“’Taylor, Private Corp., Preface, §§ 48-51. Sec Note Wilgus Cases, p. 111.
‘1 Bibliography:
'- Ames, ]. B., The Origin of Uses and Trusts, 21 Harv. Law Rev., 261-274 (1908),
2 Select Essays Anglo-Am. Legal Hist. 737-752, Lectures on Legal History, pp. 233, 243.
Cases on Trusts (1893).
Chandler, A. D., Express Trusts under Common Law (1912).
Cook, W. W., Law of Private Corporations, 7th Ed., Vol. 2, § 622 (1913).
Cook, Prof. W. W., The Place of Equity in Our Legal System, Am. Bar. Ass'n
Rept. 1912, pp. 997-1009, 3 Am. L. S. Rev. 173.
Conyngton, Thomas, Corporate Organization, Ch. XLIII, pp. 362-374.
Fletcher, Charles, Essay on Estates of Trustees (1835).
Fonblanque, ]., Treatise on Equity (1805), Book II, Chs. 1-8.
Gager, E. B., History of Equity in American Colonies and States, in two Centuries
of Growth of American Law, (Yale Univ. Studies, 1901).
Gilbert, G., Law of Uses and Trusts, (3d Ed. 1811 Sugden).
Hampson, Sir G. F., Liabilities of Trustees, and Indemnity allowed them by Courts
of Equity (1830).
, Hart, W. G., The place of trust in jurisprudence (1912), 28 Law Quart. Rev. 29o.
Hill, James, Law Relating to Trustees (1846, and subsequent editions).
1-Iogg, J. E., Legal Estate in English Property Law (1910), 22 Jurid. Rev. 55-9.
Hohfeld, W. N., Relation between Equity and Law (1913), 11 Mich. Law Rev.
537 et seq.
Holmes, O. W. ]r., Early English Equity, 1 Law Quart. Rev. (1885), pp. 162-174,,
2 Select Essays Anglo-Am. Leg. Hist. 705.
Jenks, Edward, The Legal Estate, 24 Law Quart. Rev. (1908), pp. 147-156.
Kerley, D. M., Historical Sketch of Equity Jurisdiction of Court of Chancery
(1890)
Kenneson, T. D., Cases on Trusts (1911).
Lewin, Thomas, Law of Trusts and Trustees (1839, and subsequent editions).
Loring, A. P., Trustees Handbook (311 Ed. 1907).
- Maitland, F. W., Equity (1910-13); Trust and Corporation, 3 Coll. Papers, 321-404.
Newbold, D. M., Notes on Introduction of Equity ]uris. in Maryland 1634-1720
(1906).
Page, T. N., Disappearance of fiduciary principle, 16 Am. Law Rev. 247, 302 (1908).
Perry, J. W., Treatise on Law of Trusts and Trustees, (1872 and later editions).
Pike, L. O., Common Law and Conscience, 1 Law Quart. Rev. (1885), 443-454;
2 Select Essays Anglo-Am. Leg. Hist., 722.
Pollock and Maitland, Hist. of Eng. Law, Vol. I, p. 520; Vol. II, pp. 228-239.
Robinson, C., History of High Court of Chancery, Vol. I (1882).
Sanders, F. W., Essay on Uses and Trusts (1791, and later editions).
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Trust. It is an institute of great elasticity and generality; as elastic,
as general as contract.”
Our trust is refined from the doctrine of uses as they were
established in our law before the Statute of Uses.” The older
writers traced uses to the Roman fidei-commissa, introduced in
the Roman law, 170 years B. C. to evade the laws prohibiting the
appointing of a daughter, stranger or an exile as an heir. The
testator devised his property to a qualified citizen as his heir, uni
versal devisee, or executor, with a request, by precatory words,
depending only on the good faith or honor, strong in the Roman
breast, of such heir to restore or hand over the inheritance, or a
part of it
,
to the designated person. To secure the enforcement of
the request the testator implored o
r appealed to the Emperor, to
AUGUSTUs, who flattered by such appeal, on the advice o
f
a com
mittee o
f jurisconsults, made these requests obligatory, under the
direction of the Consuls; and later under MARCUS AURELIUS, a
praetor was appointed to enforce them, acting extra ordinem.”
Later writers, such as POLLOCK and MAITLAND, doubt the direct
descent o
f
our doctrine o
f
uses and trust from this Roman origi
nal,” mainly because different terms were used in our early law.
They say, however, that “The Frank o
f
the Lex Salica, (475 A.D.)
Scrutton, T. S., Roman Law Influence in Chancery, 1 Select Essays Anglo-Am.
Legal Hist., p
.
208 e
t seq.
- Sears, J. H., Trust Estates as Business Companies (1912).
Spence, George, Equitable Jurisdiction o
f
the Court o
f Chancery (1846).
- Tax Commissioner o
f Massachusetts, Report on Voluntary Ass'ns (1912); also Re
port o
f Special Commission to investigate voluntary associations in Massachusetts (1913).
(No. 1788 House.)
Jnderhill, A., Law Relating to Private Trusts and Trustees (1896).
Veeder, V. V., A Century of English Judicature, 1 Select Essays Anglo-Am. Leg
Hist., p
.
730, 1
3
Green Bag, 23 e
t seq.
Whitlock, A. N., Classification of the Law of Trusts, 1 Cal. Law Rev. 215 (1913).
Willoughby, R
.
M. P., The Legal Estate (1912), Cambridge Univ. Press.
-
Willis, J. W., Duties and Responsibilities of Trustees (1827).
Wilson, S
. D., Courts o
f Chancery in the American Colonies, 28 Am. Law Rev.
(1884), pp. 226-255, 2 Select Essays Anglo-Am. Leg. Hist. 779.
Woodruff, E
. H., History of Chancery in Massachusetts, 5 Law Quart. Rev. 37o
(1889).
Of course much will be found in the standard works on Equity, not mentioned above
such a
s
Abbott's Cases (1909), Adams (1850 and later editions), Beach (1892), Bispham
(1878 and later editions), Eaton (1906), Hutchins and Bunker's Cases (1902), Langdell
(1904), Pomeroy (1881 and later editions), Smith, H
.
A
. (1908), Snell, G
.
H
.
T
.
(13th
Ed. 1901), Story (1836 and later editions). ,
* Maitland, Lectures on Equity, p. 23.
* Ib. p. 24.
* Spence, Equitable Jurisdiction, Vol. I, p. "435, Kent, Com., Vol. 4, p. *289.
Bernard's First Year of Roman Law, §§ 813-818; Roby, Roman Private Law, Vol. I
p
.
356.
* Maitland, Equity, p. 32; Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, 2d Ed., Vol.II, p. 239. -
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is already employing it; by the intermediation of a third person,
whom he puts in seisin of his lands and goods, he succeeds in ap
pointing or adopting an heir.”5° MAITLAND finds the same thing in
the Lombard law. He says: “The Lombard cannot make a genuine
testament. He therefore transfers the whole or some part of his
property to a Treiihander, who is to carry out his instructions.”“
Mr. Justice HOLMES says that “The feoffee to uses of the
early English law, corresponds point by point to the Salman
of the early German law. * * * The Salman, like the feoffee, was
a person] to whom land was transferred in order that he might
make a conveyance according to his grantor’s directions, * * *
usually after the grantor’s death, the grantor reserving the use of
the land himself during his life. To meet the chance of the Sal
man’s death before the time for the conveyance over, it was com
mon to employ more\ than one, and persons of importance were
selected for the office. The essence of the relation was the fiducia
or trust reposed in the fidelis manus, who sometimes confirmed his
obligation by an oath or covenant. * * * The executor of the
early German will was simply a Salman whose duty it was to see
legacies and so forth paid if the heirs refused. * * * There can
be no doubt of the identity of the continental executor and the
officer of the same name described by GLANVILLE (1180) ; and thus
the connection between the English and the German law is made
certain.“
“The beneficiary had however no action to compel the perfor
mance of the duty of the continental Salman,”“° and “the transform
ation of the honorary obligation of the feoffee into a legal obliga
tion was a purely English development/’“° This duty was enforced
against executors in the case of bequests of personal property, in
the ecclesiastical courts, and possibly to some extent in the case of
lands devisable by custom in some of the cities.“
For a long time even before the Conquest the term use had been
in use, but yet as MAITLAND wittily says, it has “mistaken its own
origin.” The word is not the Latin “usus” (i
.
e. a using of a
thing), but the Latin opus. From the 7th and 8th centuries, ad' op-us,
for “on his behalf,” is found in Lombard and Frank documents;
‘" Trust and Corporations, 3 Coll. Papers, p. 327.
"Holmes Early Eng. Equity, 1 Law Quart. Rev. 162-174 (1885); Select Essays
Anglo-Am. Leg. Hist., Vol. 2, p. 705. Maitland, Equity, p. 26.
" Note 4, Ames, Lectures on Legal History, Origin of Uses, p. 237. 2 Select
Essays Anglo-Am. Leg. Hist., 737 et seq.
"Ames, Lectures on Legal Hist. p. 237.
“Ames, Ib., p. 235; Holmes, Early Eng. Equity, 2 Select Essays Anglo-Am. Leg.
TIist., pp. 71o-714.
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in the Old French these become “al oes, ues,” which the English
tongue, confused with “use.” The Latin records however read ad
opus;-ad opus fohannis, i. e. on behalf of ]ohn. As far back as
Domesday Book, one person is constantly doing things ad opus an
other; the Sheriff seizes “ad opus Regis, as 0s le Roy/"‘” If one is
going on a crusade he occasionally conveyed his land to another
to be held to the use of his children, or his wife or sister, for he
was not certain whether a woman could hold a military fee, or
whether he could enfeotf his wife. So too, a man might want to
give his property to a convent, to the use of the library, or the
hospital. And when the Franciscan friars came as missionaries to
the English towns, about 1225, with their rule forbidding them to
own anything, the faithful benefactor, who wanted to give them
some poor dormitory in which to live and sleep, struck upon the
curious plan of conveying a house to the borough community “to
the use of,” or “as an inhabitation for” the friars. And by the
time of BRACTON, “plots of land in London had been thus con
veyed to the city for the benefit of the Franciscians.”°3 This was
in the 13th century.
In the 14th century, landowners began conveying lands to their
friends ad opus suum, to the use of themselves. Why? Because
they have found they can in effect make a will of their lands in
this way; for if A conveys his land to B to hold on behalf of A
while he lives, and then when A dies to give it to some one sug
gested by A before he dies, it is equivalent to a will. The direct
devise of lands under the feudal system had been denied to land
owners for two or three centuries. Men especially among the
great want to provide for their daughters and younger sons. Iohn
of Gaunt wants to provide for his illegitimate children. There were
other reasons also; to avoid the feudal burdens of wardship, mar
riage, forfeitures and escheats, the statutes of mortn1ain,—and per
haps also to defraud one’s creditors.“ Between I 396 and 1403, the
Chancellor had interfered to protect these beneficiaries, and is
ordering defendants by the writ of subpoena, “to do whatever shall
be ordained by us,” or to “do what right and good faith,” or “good
faith and conscience” demand, since the plaintiff “cannot have
remedy by the law of the Holy church nor by the common law ;°
‘
and one great doctrine, “Equity acts upon the person,” was taking
"Maitland, Equity, p. 24. See Note, Pollock and Maitland, Hist. of Eng. Law, 2d
Ed., Vol. II, p. 233.
“Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, Vol. 2, 2d Ed., p. 231.
"Maitland, Equity, pp. 25-30.
“Ames, Lectures on Legal History, Origin of Uses, Note 3, p. 236, and note 1,
p. 238.
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shape. “The law regards chiefly the right of the plaintiff and gives
judgment that he recover the land, debt, or damages because they,
are his. Equity lays stress upon the duty of the defendant, and
decrees that he do or refrain from doing a certain thing because
he ought to act or forbear.”
This term ‘ad opus' in the early time was used also for what we
now use “agency.” In the very ancient days both in France and
England, a man, such as the King's officer, will receive money not
as agent of, but to the use of, ad opus, the king, or some one else;
and in time, where the party is authorized to do some act in refer
ence to money or chattels on behalf of another, as where A's bail
iff, B, takes A's corn to market, sells it
,
and buys cattle, ad opus
A, this develops into a law of agency, so that if B converts the corn
o
r
cattle o
r money received to his own use (ad opus suum proprium)
the common law will recognize the wrong and furnish a remedy
in debt or account." -
It was not so however in the case of land, although it looks much
like a contract, and there certainly is an agreement when “in con
sideration o
f
a conveyance made b
y
A to X, Y, Z
,
they agree that
they will hold the land for the behoof o
f A, will allow him to enjoy
it
,
and will convey it as he shall direct.” Why is this not a con
tract, and why did the courts not enforce it? There are two
o
r
three reasons: (1) The feofee did not formally promise, o
r
covenant under his seal; (2) In the 14th century the common law
had not begun to enforce the simple contract, and b
y
the 15th
century when the simple contract began to be enforced in the courts
o
f
common law,” in an action o
f assumpsit, the Chancellor was
already in possession o
f
this field o
f jurisdiction and was already
enforcing uses b
y
means o
f
a procedure far more efficient and far
more flexible than any which the old courts could have employed:
(3) Where the promise was to convey as directed after the death
o
f
the feoffor, o
f
course the feoffor could not enforce it
,
his heir
would not, for it would be to his interest not to do so; so the only
one wanting to enforce it would be the beneficiary; the court o
f
Chancery early recognized this, and gave him the remedy, and even
in the earliest instances where the trustor and the cestui que use”
are the same, still it is as “destinatory,” not as “author o
f
the
trust” that he has the remedy. This marks it off from contract.
(4) Then again if the feoffor who was also the cestui que use, had
*Ames Ib., p
.
231.
" Pollock and Maitland, History of Eng. Law, 2d Ed., Vol. II, pp. 229, 230.
* Ib., p. 231.
* Maitland, Equity, p. 28.
"On the proper use of this term, and cestui que trust, see 26 Law Quart. Rev. 196.
-
— 17 —
only a contract right, it would be a chose in action, and inalienable,
which the landowner did not want.”
And so what kind of a right is this which the destinatory, the
beneficiary, the cestui que use, has? Is it a right in rem or in per
sonam 2 To follow MAITLAND here: “It seems a little of both.”
“The right of cestui que use or cestui que trust begins by being a
right in personam. Gradually it begins to look somewhat like a
right in rem.” But it never has become this, no, not even in the
present day.” “The new class of rights is made to look as much
like rights in rem (estates in land) as the Chancellor can make them
look; that is in harmony with the real wish of the parties who are
using the device. They are also taking the common law as their
model. Thus we get a conversion of the use into an incorporeal
thing,-in which estates and interests exist,—a sort of immaterial
ized piece of land.” “The use came to be conceived of as a sort
of metaphysical entity in which there might be estates very similar
to those which could be created in land, estates in possession, re
mainder, reversion, estates descendible in this way or that.” But
it is “neither jus in re nor ad rem, neither right, title nor interest in
law, but a species of property unknown to the common law, and
owing it
s
existence to the equitable jurisdiction o
f chancery, rest
ing upon confidence in the person and privity o
f estate; * * * it
was rather a hold upon the conscience o
f
the feoffee to uses than a
a lien upon, o
r
interest in the land; and the principle upon which
it was founded was that the feoffee was bound in conscience to fol
low the direction of the feoffor.”
“The trustee is the owner, the full owner o
f
the thing, while the
cestui que trust has no rights in the thing.”
This thing,-the trust res, o
r
trust fund owned b
y
the trustee
the court o
f chancery converted into an incorporeal thing which
can change its dress but maintain it
s identity. “Today it appears as
a piece o
f land; tomorrow it may be some gold coins th a purse;
* Maitland, Equity, pp. 28-31.
* Ib., p. 23.
*Ib., p. 29.
* Ib., p. 31.
*Ib., p. 33.
* Stebbins, Senator, in McCartee v. Orphan's Asylum (1827), 9 Cowen (N. Y.)
437, 1
8
Am. Dec. 516, 1 Wilgus, Corp. Cas. 1021. Weltner v
.
Thurmond (1908), 1
7
Wyo. 268, 129 Am. St. R
. 1113, 9
8
Pac. 590, 9
9
Pac. 1128. On the nature o
f
a trust,
see particularly cases in Ames’s Cases on Trusts, Secs. I to V, pp. 1-77, Ch. I; Secs. I
and II, Ch. II, pp. 235-278. Hart, W. G., The place of trust in jurisprudence (1912),
28 Law Q. Rev. 290; Whitlock, A
. N., Classification of the law of trusts (1913), 1 Cal.
Law Rev. pp. 215-221.
"Maitland, Equity, p. 47. Ames’s Cases, Ch. II, Sec. II, pp. 235-278; Kenneson's
Cases, Ch. II, pp. 111-152. -
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then it will be a sum of Consols; then it will be shares in a Rail
way Company; and then Peruvian Bonds. When all is going well,
changes of investment may often be made; the trustees have been
given power to make them. All along the ‘trust fund’ retains its
identity. * * * But the same idea is applied even when all is not
going well.”"
Mr. IVIAITLAND contends stoutly, and perhaps correctly, notwith
standing frequent loose statements to the contrary, that the bene
ficiary has no right in the thing, in the trust fund; the equitable
estates and interests are not jura in rem; * * * but essentially jura
in personam, not rights against the world at large but rights against
certain persons." Notwithstanding this, the beneficiary is treated
as having an estate in fee simple, or in fee tail, or for life in the
use or trust, or an equitable estate; or as having a term of years in
the use or trust. These estates and interests were to devolve and
be transmitted like the analogous estates and interests known to
and protected by the common law. The equitable fee would descend
to heirs general, the equitable estates tail to heirs in tail, equitable
chattel interests would pass to the executors or administrators.
* * * The equitable estate or interest could be conveyed or as
signed inter z-ivos; and they can be devised or bequeathed; curtesy
but not dower could be had in them; they did not escheat; and they
could be reached by a creditor of the beneficiary.
All these look like rights in rem. Yet “the right of the cestui que
trust is the benefit of an obligation,”8° and is available against not
the whole world, but only against certain persons; these are: (I)
The trustee who has undertaken to hold in trust; (2) “those who
come to the lands or goods by inheritance or succession from the
original trustee, his heir, executors, administrators, or doweress;
(3) the trustees creditors; (4) the trustees donee, who takes with
out giving a valuable consideration; (5) the purchaser from the
trustee for value, who knows of the trust; (6) the purchaser from
the trustee who ought to know of the trust,” “who would have
known of the trust had he behaved as prudent purchasers behave,”—
according to the estimate of equity judges,-—and not of an ordinary
jury. If he did not come up to this standard he was “affected with
notice,” or had “constructive notice,” and was not protected.“
“But here a limit was reached. Against a person who acquires
a legal right bona fide, for value, without notice express or con
"Maitland, Trust and Corporation, 3 Coll. Papers, pp. 350-351.
"Maitland, Equity, p. 112, et seq. Langdcll, Equity, pp. 5-6, 254 (2d Ed.).
"Ib., p. 116. But compare Mr. Whitlock's article in 1 Cal. Law Rev. 215, and
Bispham's and Pomeroy‘: Classifications.
“Maitland, Equity, pp. 117-119.
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structive of the existence of equitable rights those rights are of no
avail,"—and here is the difference between the beneficiary's right,
and a true right in rem." ,
Creation o
f Corporations.
Long ago, Lord COKE in the Case o
f Sutton’s Hospital, said these
“things are of the essence of a corporation: (I) Lawful authority
of incorporation; and that may be by four means, sc. by the com
mon law, as the King himself, etc.; by authority of parliament;
by the King’s Charter, (as in this case) ; and by prescription. The
2d which is of the essence of the incorporation, are parties to be in
corporated, and that in two manners, sc. persons natural, or bodies
incorporate and political. (3) A name by which they are incor
porated, as in this case governors of the lands, etc. (4) Of a place,
for without a place no incorporation can be made; here the place
is in the charter house in the County of Middlesex. * * * (5) By
words sufficient in law, but not restrained to any certain legal and
prescript form of words.””
This statement, for the most part is as applicable and accurate
today as it was three hundred years ago when it was written. We
yet have corporations existing by the common law,—as the state
itself is a corporation, and our governors and ofiicers are corpora
tions sole for certain purposes, by implication or necessity.“ Public
corporations may exist with us by prescription, and private also,
where the statute of limitations runs against the state in quo war
ranto proceedings." We still have corporations in this country that
exist by virtue of a King’s charter granted before the revolution, as
in the case of Dartmouth College.“ This method of creating cor
porations de nov0, still exists in England, but of course not with us;
and although Lord BALTIMORE, under authority conferred upon him
by the Charter of Maryland in 1667 incorporated the Mayor, Re
corder, Aldermen and Common Council of the City of St. Marys,
and William PENN, by a similar provision in the Charter of Penn
sylvania, in 1701 granted a charter of incorporation to the city of
*2Ib., p. 119.
“The Case of Sutton’s'Hospital (1613) 1o Coke 1, 23a ct scq., 1 Wilgus Cases,
p. 264." The Governor v. Allen (1847), 8 Humph. (27 Tenn.) 176, 1 Wilgus, Corp. Cages,
270, note 275.
“Greene v. Dennis (1826), 6 Conn. 292, 16 Am. Dec. 58, 1 Wilgus Cases, 275, note
278; State v. Pawtuxet Turnpike Co. (1867), 8 R. I. 521, 94 Am. Dec. 123; People v.
Oakland Co. Bank, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 285.
"Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819), 4 Wheat. (17 U. 5.), 518,
1 Wilgus, Corp. Cas. 708.
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Philadelphia," no such power now exists with us in any executive
or judicial office. And since the American revolution the power to
create corporations, with us, has resided in our legislative bodies ex
clusively.” Such power, however, when in our legislatures, is quali
fied only by constitutional limitations.” And in the absence of con
stitutional provision the legislature may act by special or general
laws. General incorporation laws probably existed at Rome.“ In
England the first general incorporation law was enacted by Parlia
ment in I 597 for the erection of hospitals; this was made perpetual
in 1624; it is still in force, and Lord COKE, in his Second Institute
gives the act and a proper form for incorporation under it.“ The
political dogmas of the American and French revolutions, that all
men are created equal, and are entitled to equal rights, issued in the
demand for equal privileges in the formation of corporations.
To satisfy this demand and prevent the fraud and legislative job
bery incident to the granting of the privileges of incorporation by
special acts, it became the policy to incorporate under general laws.
As early as I784, general laws were passed in New York for the
incorporation of Churches; these were followed rapidly in other
states. In I811, New York passed the first general incorporation
law for incorporating manufacturing corporations. This was fol
lowed in Massachusetts in I836; in Connecticut and Michigan in
I837; and by Indiana in 1838.“
But passing general laws did not meet the whole difficulty, for
the legislatures continued to create corporations under special acts.
Constitutional limitations therefore became necessary. In 1821 New
York required the assent of two-thirds of the members of both
houses of its legislature.
In I838 Florida by constitutional provision forbade the incorpora
tion of churches by special act, and directed that a general law be
enacted for their creation. In 1845 Louisiana did the same for all
except municipal corporations. In 1846 New York did likewise;
" McKim v. Odom, 3 Bland Ch. (Md.) 407, 1 Wilgus Corp. Cas. 222; 1 Wilson's
Wm-ks, (Andrews' Ed.), 561; Machen, Modern Law of Corporations, p. 3, note 3.
Poore’s Charters Vol. 2, p. 1388, Par. 14 (North Carolina).
“Franklin Bridge C0. v. Wood (1853), 14 Ga. 80, 1 Wilgus, Corp. Cas. 279,
note 286.
wBe11 v_ Bank of Nashville (1823), Peck (7 Tenn.) 269; Penobscot Boom Corp. v.
Lamson (1839), 16 Me. (4 Shep) 224, 33 Am. Dec. 656, 1 \‘Vilgus, Corp. Cas. 283; 1
Hamilton's Works, iii; 1 Wilson's WOrl-cs, 561; Luxton v. North River Bridge Co.
(1894). 1sa U. 5- 525- _
"Baldwin, Modern Political Institutions, Freedom of Incorporatuon.
°‘ 39 Eliz. Ch. 5 (1597); 21 Jas. 1, Ch. 1, (1624); 2 Inst., p. 723; 6 Encyc. of Laws
of England 233.
9aN0te (b) 2 Kent's Com. p. [$42]. Laws of New York 1784, 7 Secs., Ch. 18;
Laws of N. Y., 1811, Ch. 67, 34 Secs. Notes 1 and 2, 1 Machen, Corp. p. 15.
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and now almost every state constitution provides that the legisla
tures shall pass no special act creating corporations or conferring
corporate powers, but all corporations shall be created under general
laws which shall be subject to amendment and repeal by the legis
lature at any time.” Mr. FROST says special charters can be granted
in only seven states."
In speaking of the general incorporation laws, Mr. MACHEN says,
“The statutes in some states consist of a jumble of old acts thrown
together almost indiscriminately with more recent amendments. In
other states, the legisatures have intended to display the utmost lib
erality; but unfortunately this disposition has often been evinced by
removing salutary restrictions and at the same time, in order to
make a show of legislative regulation, by imposing vexatious and
unreasoning restraints.” -
Mr. FROST says that “a great majority of the business corporation
acts in force in this country today are sadly in need of revision.
* * * The incorporation laws of Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Mary
land are veritable “legal antiques,” * * * and the acts of many of
the states are “wonderfully and fearfully made.” And every law
yer that has tried to find out the real meaning of the corporation
statutes of a single state, knows that such mild expressions are alto
gether too euphonious to do the subject justice.
Not only are incorporation laws notoriously uncertain in mean
ing, but they are inflexible so long as they last, and when, in what
way, and to what extent, they will be changed by the legislature,
Providence only, if anyone, can tell.
Then again one must at his peril substantially comply with the
law whether he can determine its meaning or not; and in many
states if he fails so to comply he can only say some sort of disaster
will follow, exactly what under the present state of authorities, he
cannot tell, for it is concealed in gremio legis et curiae; in one place
it will be de facto existence;" in another not;" in one a full part
nership liability for members; in another an individual liability for
participants,"—but for all, even though they acted in good faith,
it will be something different from what they intended.
* Private Corporations, Wilgus, p. 118, Const. Fla. 1838, Art. 13, Sec. 1; Louis
iana Const. 1845; New York Const. 1821, Art. 7, Sec. 9; Const. 1846, Art. 8, Sec. 3.
* Frost, Incorporation and Organization of Corporations, p. 2 (4th Ed).
* Machen, Corp. p. 17.
* Frost, Inc. & Organ. Corp. pp. 3, 7 (4th Ed.).
* Finnegan v. Noerenberg (1893), 52 Minn. 239, 38 Am. St. Rep. 552, 1 Wilgus,
Cases, 614.
* Kaiser v. Lawrence Sav. Bank (1881), 56 Ia. 104, I Wilgus, Cases 607; Berge
ron v. Hobbs (1897), 96 Wis. 641, 65 Am. St. R. 85, 1 Wilgus, Cases 611.
* Martin v. Fewell (1883), 79 Mo. 401, 1 Wilgus, Cases 673, note 676.
* Fay v. Noble (1851), 7 Cush. (Mass.), 188, 1 Wilgus, Cases, p. 677, note 681.
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Then too it is difficult, if not impossible, unless the Supreme
Court has passed upon it
,
to say what is the period o
f corporate
gestation, when it begins o
r
when it ends, when corporate birth
really occurs, when corporate parturition is complete, when the um
bilical cord is cut, and the corporate “personality” is acquired. For
example, where the statute reads that “articles o
f incorporation
shall be executed stating name, purpose, place o
f business, term,
number o
f directors, names o
f
those for first year, amount o
f cap
ital stock, and number o
f shares, and shall be filed in the office o
f
the secretary o
f
state, and thereupon the signers shall be a corpora
tion,” a
t
least four different views are taken: (1) Corporate life
for al
l
purposes begins immediately o
n filing the articles, ipso facto
e
o instanti, without reference to any stock subscription o
r organiza
tion." (2) There is no corporate life until corporate organization,
by election o
r appointment o
f
officers.” (3) There is only a quali
fied corporate existence resulting from filing articles and adult cor
porate life only after the requisite stock is subscribed and paid in."
(4) Corporate life begins on the filing, but the incorporators whether
subscribing for stock o
r not, are tenants in common o
f
the proposed
annount until it is duly subscribed b
y
others."
Creation o
f Express Trusts.
Upon the other hand the creation o
f
a
n express trust is a matter
o
f
the mere declaration o
f
the trustor o
r declarant, accepted by the
trustee, o
r o
f
a contract between them." There are no special stat
utes to comply with except the Statute o
f Frauds, the Statute o
f
Uses, statutes relating to Perpetuities, and to Conveyancing and Re
cording.
These will be considered in other connections. A
t
this point it is
only necessary to say that for the most part these are easily com
plied with. The Express Trust is a matter o
f
a declaration o
f
a
n
owner o
r o
f
an agreement between parties under their common law
rights and can be moulded to suit the needs and wishes o
f
the par
ties, and it can be made as certain, definite and clear as the skill o
f
the draftsman will permit in expressing the intentions o
f
the par
ties,"—and it will at least not be defeated b
y
incorrect guesses a
t
the meaning o
f uncertain, if not inconsistent, provisions of written
law. The balance here certainly is in favor o
f
the trust.
"Singer Mfg. Co. v. Peck (1896), 9 S. Dak. 29, 67 N. W. 947, 1 Wilgus, Cases 571.
*Walton v. Oliver (1892), 49 Kans. 107, 33 Am. St. R. 355, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 565.
"Wechselberg v. Flour City National Bank (1894), 24 U
.
S
. App. 308, 1 Wilgus,
Cases, 574.
* Hawes v. Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co. (1869), 101 Mass. 385, 1 Wilgus, Cases 581.* Maitland, Equity, pp. 53-56.* Ib., 57-70.
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Steps in Creation of Corporations.
Mr. FROST enumerates" the various steps necessary to create a
corporation under modern business corporation acts, as follows:
(1) The drafting of the articles of incorporation;
(2) The signing of the articles by the requisite number of incor
porators, and the acknowledgement of the same before an officer
duly authorized to take such acknowledgements;
(3) Filing and recording the articles with the proper state and
county officials after payment of the requisite organization tax and
filing and recording fees;
-
(4) Organization of the corporation ready for the transaction
of business;
(5) Securing the necessary permit from state officials (if any
is required), to transact business in the domiciliary state.
Steps in Creation of Trust.
On the other hand a recent case has said the requisites of a valid
trust are: “(1) A designated beneficiary; (2) a designated trustee,
who must not be the beneficiary; (3) a fund or other property suffi
ciently designated or identified to enable title thereto to pass to the
trustee; and (4) the actual delivery of the fund or other property,
or of a legal assignment thereof to the trustee, with the intention of
passing legal title thereto to him as trustee.”
Let us consider these things a little more fully in reference to the
creation of Corporations and of Trusts.
The Incorporation Paper.
Under all general incorporation laws, some kind of a document
must be executed in a particular way, and filed, deposited, or record
ed, in a specific way. The name of this document is various,—“deed
of settlement,” “articles of association,” “articles of incorporation,”
“articles,” “certificate of incorporation,” “charter,” “memorandum
of association,”—all of which Mr. MACHEN considers objectionable,
and suggests that “incorporation paper” be used, although as he
says, that “term does not seem to have been used in any state or
country.” It seems however that it is not fatal to call it Articles
of Association when it ought to be called “Charter.”
* Frost, Inc. and Org. Corp., p. 12 (4th Ed.).
* Brown v. Spohr, 18o N. Y. 201, 209, 73 N. E. 14, 16; Central Trust Co. v.
Gaffney, 142 N. Y. S. 902, 905, 157 App. D. 501. Kemmerer v. Kemmerer (1908), 233
Ill. 327, 122 Am. St. R. 169, 84 N. E. 256; Ranney v. Byers (1908), 219 Pa. 332, 123
Am. St. R. 660, 68 Atl. 971.
* Machen, Corporations, p. 30, § 32.* Kaiser v. Lawrence Sav. Bk. (1881), 56 Ia. 104, I Wilgus, Cases 607, on 608.
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In any event there must be a written or printed incorporation
paper?“ The drafting of this document, under printed forms, that
are usually furnished upon application seems to be a simple matter,
and is often done without much professional consideration. How
ever since the document, will constitute, together with the law under
which it is executed, a contract of a dual nature,-—one between the
corporation and the state, and another among the shareholders them
selves,“'-’ to be construed “rigidly in favor of the public and against
the corporation ;”“""' and since the express powers of a corporation
are such as are found expressed in the statute under which the cor
poration is to be formed, or such, as though not so expressed, may
be lawfully claimed, if specified in the incorporation paper. though
not otherwise, much skill is required to get the best results?“ Mr.
FROST enumerates 28 different classes of express powers, 21 of which
are expressed in most general laws, but 7 of which if desired. must
usually be claimed in the incorporation paper, if they can be had at
all ;“" and, although formerly it was held that one state could not
spawn its corporate progeny to do business in another state, yet that
view has been abandoned so completely that the states have become
unseemly competitors in vending their corporate wares, to such an
extent that every important business seeking incorporation asks
where can the incorporation be had with a maximum of power, and
a minimum of inconvenience; so where to incorporate has become
a question of extreme importance, and can be answered only par
tially by any lawyer after careful investigation and comparison of
statutes. Mr. FROST suggests 21 questions to be answered in this
connection, and these certainly do not cover more than half the
ground; all these considerations make it certain that the proper
drafting of important incorporation papers requires a high degree of
skill and experience?“
The incorporation paper must be executed as the statute provides,
and there are many pitfalls here also. If the statute says that “any
number” may form a corporation, by signing articles of association,
and stating, among other things, the “names and residence" of the
signers, and there are 27 signers, but only two state their residences,
the corporation in Indiana, at least, is not dc jure,"" so too if the
“1_Utley v. Union Tool C0. (1858), 11 Gray (Mass), 139, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 597.
1" Machen, Corporations, pp. 32-33; Wilgus, Corp. Cases, p. 707 et seq.
*1‘Oregon Ry. Co. v. Oregonian Co. (1888), 130 U. S. 1, 1 Wilgus, Cases, p. 429.
1“ Machen, Corporations, §§ 48-63, 64-102.
"5 Frost, Inc. & Org. of Corporations, 4th Ed., §§ 17, 18, pp. 34-36.
1“ Ib. § 18, p. 35. V\filgus, Corporations, § 49.
1" Busenback v. Attica &c. Road Co. (1873), 43 Ind. 265, 1 Wilgus, Cases, p. 600.
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residence of directors is omitted when the statute requires it; so
where the "principal place of business” is to be stated, it won't do
to say “the operations of the company are to be carried on" in a
certain county; and in Maryland it seems that even a church, though
it has been running as an incorporated body for years, taking a deed
for it
s property, giving a mortgage upon it
,
issuing bonds, etc., can
not be held liable for it
s just debts, if its articles were acknowledged
before only one justice o
f
the peace, when two were required." And
in Wisconsin, where the statute requires the certificate o
f organiza
tion to be filed with the register o
f deeds,—and where the original
certificate o
f organization was left with the recorder, long enough
to be recorded in his office, and was so recorded b
y
copying in the
record books, and was then returned to the supposed corporation,
instead o
f being left on file in the recorder's office, there was neither
a corporation de jure nor de facto.”
Then too the incorporation fee, varying from a few dollars in
some states to a large sum in others must be paid, o
r
there is
,
a
t least,
in Colorado, neither a corporation de jure, de facto nor b
y estoppel.”
In Arizona it would have cost $45 to incorporate the United States
Steel Corporation; it cost $220,000 in New Jersey; and it would have
cost in Pennsylvania, $3,666,666.”
I have already spoken sufficiently of the variety of view, and con
flict o
f authority as to when the corporate organization is complete,
and real corporate birth occurs. Under the statutes o
f many states
certain things must be done before the corporation can “commence
business,” and there has been much difficulty to determine the result
o
f
a failure to do all these things. Perhaps it is reasonably safe to
say that if the duty to do these things before commencing business
is placed b
y
the statute upon those seeking incorporation, such will
b
e
a mandatory condition precedent to valid corporate existence:
whereas if the duty seems to be rather upon the corporation, instead
o
f
those seeking incorporation, it will be a condition subsequent; but
in either case the state can bring quo warranto, in the one case
against the unsuccessful incorporators, in the other against the de
faulting corporation, disaster being possible in either case.”
11sHarris & Stickle v
. McGregor (1865), 2
9
Cal. 124, 1 Wilgus, Cases, p
.
603.
* Boyce v. Trustees &c. (1876), 46 Md. 359, 1 Wilgus, Cases, p. 642.
1
2
0
Bergeron v
.
Hobbs (1897), 9
6
Wis. 641, 6
5
Am. St. R
. 85, I Wilgus, Cases, 611.* Jones v. Aspen Hardware Co. (1895), 21 Colo. 263, 52 Am. St. R. 220, 1 Wilgus,
Cases, 637.* Frost, Inc. & Org. Corp., 4th Ed., Table iii.* Mokelumne Hill Mining Co. v. Woodbury (1859), 14 Cal. 424, 73 Am. Dec. 658,
1 Wilgus, Cases 296; Harrod v
. Hamer, (1873), 3
2
Wis. 162, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 586.
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Trust Instrument.
Now let us see how it stands with an Express Trust. MAITLAND
says: “In the old days no deed, no writing was necessary to create
a use, trust or confidence. I enfeoff you, and by word of mouth I
declare that you are to hold to the use of X. You must hold to the
use of X. As to trusts this still is law, except in so far as it has been
altered by the Statute of Frauds.”
The Statute of Frauds of 1677, provided (§ 7) that “All declara
tions of or creations of trusts or confidences of any lands, tenements
or hereditaments shall be manifested and proved by some writing
signed by the party who is by law enabled to declare such trust, or
by his last will in writing, or else they shall be utterly void and of no
effect,” but by section 8, this was not to apply where the trust results
“by the implication or construction of law.”
It is to be noted here that this statute applies only to real property,
and not personal property;” that writing only, not a deed, no sealed
instrument, no witness, no acknowledgement is necessary; and fur
ther no writing is necessary to create the trust, but only to manifest
and prove it “The statute will be satisfied if the trust can be man
ifested and proved by any subsequent acknowledgement by the trust
ee, as by an express declaration by him or by a memorandum to that
effect, or by a letter under his hand, or by a recital in a deed exe
cuted by him; and the trust, however late the proof, operates retro
spectively from the time of it
s creation.” But Courts of Equity
went further and held “the Statute o
f
Frauds does not prevent the
proof o
f fraud,” and “it is a fraud for a person who knows land has
been conveyed to him in trust, to deny the trust and claim the land
himself.”
In a few states this section of the Statute of Frauds is not in force,
and in a few, a deed instead o
f merely a writing is required, but in
most states the statute is in force with the effect above given.”
As noted it does not apply to personal property, nor does it require
a contract or consideration to make one a trustee."
The 9th section o
f
this statute however required that every grant
o
r assignment o
f
a trust, that is the beneficial interest, “be in writing,”
* Maitland, Equity, p. 57.* 29 Chas. II, c. 3. Maitland's Equity, p. 57; Ranney v. Byers, (1908), 219 Pa.
332, 123 Am. St. R
. 660, 68 Atl. 971; Ames, Cases, § 8
,
pp. 176-189.* Maitland, Equity, pp. 58-59.
* Lewin, Trusts, 11th Ed., p. 56; Maitland, Equity, p. 58.
* Maitland, Equity, 59; Rochefoucauld v. Bonstead, (1897), 1 Ch. 196.
* Cook, Trusts & Tusttees, § 53; Ames, Cases, pp. 176-177.* Maitland, Equity, p. 53; Cook, Trusts & Trustees, §§ 45-47.
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and not merely manifested or proved by a writing.” So too the
13th Elizabeth forbidding all conveyances to delay, hinder or de
fraud, creditors; and the 27th Elizabeth forbidding voluntary con
veyances to defraud and deceive subsequent purchasers, of course,
apply to conveyances in trust as well as to other conveyances. These
are generally in force in this country.” -
To quote MAITLAND again: “The creation of a trust may be a
perfectly unilateral act, there may not be more than one party to it
.
* * * I declare myself a trustee of this watch for my son who is in
India. If I afterwards sell that watch, although my son has never
heard o
f
the benefit that I had intended for him, I commit a breach
o
f
trust and my son has a
n equitable cause o
f
action against me.”
While it is usually said that “no one can be compelled to undertake
a trust,” yet because courts o
f Equity have been so jealous o
f
its
pet, MAITLAND points out “In practice it would not be very sage to
rely upon this doctrine, for one may very easily do something o
r
say something that can b
e regarded as an acceptance o
f
the trust”
with a
ll
it
s
attendant duties, that cannot be easily got rid o
f. “There
fore if you hear that anyone has been conveying property to you as
a trustee, and you do not wish to be burdened with a trustee's duties,
you will be wise in repudiating in some emphatic manner the rights
and the duties which were to have been thrust upon you.”
No specific words are necessary. “The words use and trust are
not sacramental terms.” In fact “the most untechnical words,” mere
precatory words, such a
s “desire,” “will,” “request,” “entreat,” “be
seech,” “recommend,” “hope,” “do not doubt,” have been held suffi
cient in wills; all that is required is a reasonably clear expression
of the declarant.”
The Statute o
f Uses, 27 Henry VIII, 1535, provided that the legal
estate should follow the use, so that the beneficiary should thereafter
become the legal owner. It read that wherever one person “was
seized o
f
land to the use o
f another,” in fee simple, o
r
fee tail, o
r
for life, or for years, the latter shall be deemed to be in lawful,
seizin, estate, and possession, o
f
such land in such like estate as h
e
had in the use.” It is to be noted (I) The Statute does not apply
to chattels personal. (2) Nor does it apply to leaseholds for years,
that is where the estate in the trustee is for years, since seizin applied
* Maitland's Equity, p. 58.* Bispham, Equity, §§ 241, 250.
* Maitland, Equity, pp. 53-54.
* Maitland, Equity, pp. 55-56.* Maitland, Equity, pp. 38, 66; Kemmerer v. Kemmerer (1908), 233 Ill. 327, 122
Am. St. R
. 169, 84 N. E
. 256; Ames, Cases, pp. 77-107; Kenneson, Cases, pp. 16-21.* Maitland, Equity, 35; Kenneson, Cases, 34-37.
– 28–
only to freeholds; but on the other hand if land is conveyed to A and
his heirs to hold to the use of B for 1,000 years, this use is executed
and B becomes the legal owner, not of the fee, but of the term of
years; but if B assigns it to X to the use of Y, the latter will have
only an Equitable estate. (3) Again the Statute does not apply where
there is an active trust. “I convey land unto A and his heirs, to the
use that they shall sell the land and divide the proceeds among my
children, or upon trust that they shall so sell and divide. The Stat
ute has nothing to say to this case. You do not find one person seized
in trust for another person, you find A seized upon trust to make a
sale.” The test seems to be, does the instrument merely tell A that
B is to have the enjoyment or does it impose upon A some special
duty in regard to the property as to manage and control it
,
and col
lect and pay the profits to the beneficiary?; if the latter the trust is
active, not passive, and the Statute o
f
Uses does not thrust the legal
title o
n
the beneficiary. (4) Finally after Tyrrell's Case in 1557, it
was held that the Statute exhausted itself in executing the first use,
and so, in the case o
f
a use upon a use, it did not execute the second
use.” This however is a matter that applies to conveyancing.
Again no filing o
r recording o
f
the trust instrument is necessary
to make the trust valid, at least a
s
to the parties o
r
those who know
o
r ought to know o
f
it
s
existence o
r
terms.”
The trust deed in the Sugar Trust case provided that “The cus
tody o
f
the deed was to be in the president o
f
the board, with sole
and independent control, and not to b
e
shown to any corporation,
firm o
r person whatsoever except b
y
express direction o
f
the
board.” If it is required to be put in the form of a deed, as in
some states, then, o
f course, it must conform to the statutes relating
thereto, and those relating to registration and recording such deeds,
in order to furnish constructive notice. But these rules are simple,
definite and certain, and easily complied with." Unless the trust is
to do business in an artificial name, o
r
a
s
a partnership, and there are
statutes requiring registration, there are no other statutes except in a
few states, affecting the creation o
f trusts, except those relating to
perpetuities. These will be referred to in other connections.
Again no fees are to be paid to the state, o
r
other officers, except
recording fees when the instrument is a deed o
f conveyance. Of
course if the legal estate in land is conveyed in trust, the rules relat
ing to the conveyance o
f
the legal title to the trustee, apply just the
* Maitland, Equity, 35-38; Tyrrell's Case, 2 Dyer, 155a, pl. 20, Kenneson, Cases, 37.
* Carson v. Phelps, (1873), 4o Md. 73.* People v. North River Sugar Ref. Co., (1890), 121 N. Y. 582, 18 Am. St. R. 843,
1 Wilgus, Cases, 1oo.
* 39 Cyc. 55-56.
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same as they apply to a conveyance of land to any other party. And
in general whatever rules apply to the transfer of any particular
kind of property, to another person, will apply when such is to be
conveyed to a trustee in trust.” And a promise to create a volun
tary trust will not be enforced. The rules we have been discussing
apply only to the creation of the trust estate itself.
It seems here again that the balance of simplicity so far as formal
ities of creation are concerned is in favor of the trust.
141Ib.

II.
Parties to Be Incorporated:
Coke’s second requisite of corporate existence was parties to in
corporate, and he indicated that these might be either natural or arti
ficial. It seems now that the latter, i. e. corporations cannot, unless
authorized expressly or by necessary implication be either an in
corporator or member of another corporation?“‘ General incorpor
ation laws contemplate incorporators and members. The former
are persons, in the case of business corporations, whose function it
is to bring the corporation into existence under the statute; they
may or may not themselves. become members by taking stock. When
the corporation is organized, their functions, as incorporators,
cease?“ On the other hand the members are those who become
such by ownership of stock, and in the beginning, this ownership is
acquired through a subscription. If this is made after the corpora
tion is created, and capable of contracting, the ordinary rules of con
tract may apply.“'* -
In most cases, however, there can be no corporation until mem
bers are secured, and this must be either before or contemporan
eously with the coming into existence of the corporation. This sit
uation has puzzled the courts exceedingly. There are numerous
views; (I) Such a preliminary agreement has no force and effect,
unless it strictly conforms to the statute, as signing and acknowledg
ing the incorporation paper ;‘“ (2) That it is a valid contract from
the time the requisite amount is subscribed, from which a party can
not thereafter withdraw and which is enforceable against the estate
of one. who dies before the corporation comes into existence and
accepts it ;“" (3) That such a preliminary subscription is a mere
withdrawable offer, revocable by death or insanity, at any time be
fore the corporation comes into existence and accepts it expressly or
' Continued from December issue.
"11 Denny Hotel Co. v. Schram (1393) 6 Wash. !34, 36 Am. St. R. 130, 1 Wilgus,
Cases, 553. Note, Ib., p. 889.
1" Nickum v. Burkhardtt, (1897) 30 Ore. 464, 60 Am. St. R. 822, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 391.
1“ Southwestern State C0. v. Stephens (1909) 139 Wis. 616, 131 Am. St. R. 1074,
29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 92, 120 N. W. 403.
"Sedalia, Warsaw etc. Co. v. Wilkerson, (1884) 83 Mo. 235, 1 Wilgus, Cases. 459;
Coppage v. Hutton (1890) 124 Ind 401, 7 L. R. A. 591, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 469.
1“ Tonica & Petersburg R. R. Co. v. McNeeley (1859) =1 Ill. 71, 1 Wilgus, Cases,
491.
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impliedly;” (4) That such a subscription is a mere withdrawable
offer to the future corporation, but a contract among the subscrib
ers." Where the courts have not already passed on it
,
it is impos
sible to tell which view they will take. Of course if al
l
goes well,
and the corporation is duly formed and accepts the subscriptions
made, they will be binding, but until that time there is always great
uncertainty from the possibility o
f
death o
r
withdrawal o
f
a sub
scriber. The difficulty o
f
the courts is that “it takes two to make
a contract,” and, since the corporation cannot be bound until it comes
into existence and has proper officers to bind it
,
the other party
cannot be bound. To get around this view subscriptions are some
times made with a trustee for the unborn corporation, which a court
o
f equity will enforce in it
s
favor whenever the corporation comes
into existence.***
Parties to a Trust:
This again shows the simpler theory that underlies the trust. If
A gives money or other property to B
,
in trust for C
,
o
r
even if
A declares that he holds money or other property in trust for C
C whether in existence at the time or not, whenever he comes into
existence, a
t
least if within the rule relating to perpetuities, can
enforce the trust in equity. In other words only one party or person
is necessary to declare a trust; al
l
the trustee has to d
o
is to accept
it expressly or impliedly, and the beneficiary does not have to do
that. All that is required is for the settlor to express an intent to
create a trust, and designate some one a trustee, and some one a
beneficiary.”
Of course this declaration of trust must be distinguished from a
gift. If I write a letter to my son saying “I give you my Blackacre
estate, my lease-hold house in the High Street, the sum o
f
£1000.
Consols standing in my name, the wine in my cellar,” this does not
create a trust, nor does it make a valid gift for a letter will not do to
make such conveyances; even if I execute a deed covenanting to
convey and assign these things, there is not yet a trust nor a perfect
gift, and the reason is “I make it clear I do not intend to make my
1
." Bryant's Pond Steam Mill Co. v. Felt (1895) 87 Me. 234, 47 Am. St. R
. 323, 1
Wilgus, Cases 474.
1
4
7
Minneapolis Threshing Machine Co. v
. Davis, 4
0
Minn. 110, 1
2
Am. St. R
. 701,
3 L. R
.
A
.
796, 4
1
N
.
W. 1026, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 492. Nebraska Chickory Co. v
. Led
nicky, (1907) 79 Neb. 587, 113 N. W. 245.
* San Joaquin Land Co. v. West (1892) 94 Cal. 399, 29 Pac. 785, 1 Wilgus, Cases
497; West v
.
Crawford (1889) 8
o
Cal. 19, 1 Wilgus, Cases 5oo.* Ames, Cases, note p. 213; Kenneson's Cases, p. 89, 28 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of
Law, p
.
11oo.
self a trustee, I mean to give” instead, and an intention to give, with
out delivering the gift is not a gift. “The two intentions are very
different, the giver means to get rid of his rights, the man who is
intending to make himself a trustee intends to retain his rights but
to come under an onerous obligation.” “An imperfect gift is no
declaration of trust.”
“Every person who can hold and dispose of any legal or equit
able estate or interest in property, may create a trust in respect of
such estate or interest,”—the state, a private corporation, married
women, an infant at least till he avoids it
,
and aliens and non-resi
dents." Still further it is the constitutional right under the Fed
eral constitution of a citizen of one state to constitute a citizen of
another state a trustee o
f
his property real o
r personal,
wherever the property is located. The Indiana statute forbidding
this was declared unconstitutional.”
So too any kind o
f property may be held in trust; real, personal,
legal, equitable, in possession o
r
in action, (if assignable), in re
mainder, reversion, o
r expectancy, domestic or foreign, can be the
subject o
f
a declaration o
f trust, subject to the rules above given.”
Any one capable o
f holding property, may be a trustee, an infant,
married women, corporation, o
r alien, o
r
even a person o
f
unsound
mind. And in the case o
f
an infant or lunatic, trustee, a court of
equity can vest the title in some suitable person to carry out the
trust. One o
f
several beneficiaries may be a trustee if the settlor
so appoints.”
So too any one can be a beneficiary,—infants, married women,
corporations, unincorporated bodies, residents o
r non-residents,
any one capable o
f taking and holding any kind o
f property and no
acceptance b
y
the beneficiary is necessary.”
The other three requisites o
f corporate existence named b
y
Lord
Coke,—name, place, and proper words, along with some others are
provided for under general laws in the Incorporation Paper. This
usually requires (1) the name, (2) the place, (3) the purpose, (4)
the capital stock, (5) the number o
f directors, and (6) the duration
* Maitland, Equity, pp. 73, 74.
* 27 Am. & Eng. Encyc., 1st Ed. 13.
* Sears, Trust Estates etc., p. 194; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Chicago etc.
Ry. Co. (1886) 2
7
Fed. Rep. 146; Roby v
.
Smith (1891) 131 Ind. 342, 20 N. E
.
1093.
* 27 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 1st Ed. 24, 25. Note, Ames, Cases, p. 193.
* 27 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 1st Ed. 16, 17; Cook, Trusts & Trustees, §§ 1 Io-1 18.
* 27 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 1st Ed. 23; Ames, Cases, pp. 215-231; Kenneson, Cases,
90-97; Loring, Trustees Handbook, p
.
1
5
(3d Ed.); Connecticut Riv. Sav. Bank v. Albee
(1892) 64 Vt. 571, 33 Am. St. R
.
944.
to be stated?-"“ The purpose of course of this Incorporation Paper
is to give definite form to a particular corporation,—to make spe
cific for a single corporation what is general and applicable to all
corporations of that class.
Although as we have seen no formal instrument is necessary to
the creation of a valid trust, yet in the cast of an express trust for
business a deed or declaration of trust is drawn up: (1) Providing
for a name; (2) Designating trustees, and providing for their suc
cession; (3) Providing for the raising and conveying the trust res
or fund to the trustees, and defining their rights, powers and duties
in reference thereto; (4) Providing for the issue of transferable
certificates to those who are the cestuis que trust, in proportion to
their respective beneficial interests in the property and profits; (5)
Providing for division of profits; (6) Limiting liability of trustees
and beneficiaries; (7) Fixing the duration, and providing for.disso
lution at the termination of the trust?“
These are so similar to the requirements of the incorporation
paper that they may be taken up in order and compared with some
detail. .
Corporate Name:
It was long ago said that the corporate name is a baptismal one,
and of the very. being of the corporate constitution. It is now
universally required to be stated in 'the incorporation paper, although
it perhaps could be acquired under the common law by user. When
rightfully acquired the corporation is considered as having a fran
chise therein, with the same exclusive right to its use in the incor
porating state that it would have in a trade mark, including the
right to enjoin its use by another domestic corporation. In several
states particular provisions exist in relation to the selection and
publication of the corporate name that must be strictly complied
with. It has been held that a change of corporate name without au
thority, makes the members liable as partners?“
Trust Name :
In the absence of a statute forbidding, a natural person may do
business in his own name or in any name he pleases to assume as a
business name, so long as it does not infringe another’s right in a
1“ 1 Wilgus, Cases, pp. 435-440.
"’ Conyngton, Corporate Organization, p. 366.
_ "' 1 Wilgus, Cases, pp. 816-829. V
name already in use by the latter.” Since the trustees are natural
persons, they may choose such name in which to carry on business
if they so desire, or the name may be, probably should be and usually
is designated in the deed of trust, as for example, a trust deed in
which Richard Olney, Moorefield Storey and William F. Beal are
trustees (and therefore likely to have been drawn with the utmost
legal skill) provides: “49. The trusts of these presents may be col
lectively designated for all purposes thereof as the Old South Build
ing Trust, and the Trustees may for the like purposes be referred to
as the Trustees of the Old South Building Trust.”
Another signed by similarly distinguished lawyers, provides;
“First. The trustees, in their collective capacity, shall be designated,
so far as practicable, as the “Massachusetts Electric Companies,”
and under that name shall, so far as practicable, conduct all business
and execute a
ll
instruments in writing, in performance o
f
their
trust.”101
Some states have statutes, a
s
has Michigan, providing that “No
person o
r persons shall hereafter carry on o
r
conduct o
r
transact
business in this state under any assumed name, o
r
under any desig
nation, name, o
r style, corporate o
r otherwise, other than the real
name o
r
names o
f
the individual o
r
individuals owning, conducting,
o
r transacting, such business, unless such persons shall file in the
office o
f
the clerk o
f
the county o
r
counties in which such person
o
r persons own, conduct, or transact o
r
intend to own, conduct o
r
transact such business, o
r
maintain an office o
r place o
f business, a
certificate setting forth the name o
r
names under which such bus
iness owned is
,
or is to be conducted, or transacted and the true or
real full name or names o
f
the person o
r persons owning, conduct
ing o
r transacting the same, with the home and post office address
o
r
addresses o
f
said person o
r persons,” under specified penalty
for failure. By a later provision this was specifically extended to
partnerships, and no change in name shall be made until a new cer
tificate shall be filed giving the facts, the old members remaining
liable until this new certificate is filed.”
This o
f
course would apply to trustees carrying on business under
a
n
artificial name. And presumably, also, if the trust is so organized
* Sparks v. Dispatch Transfer Co. (1891) 104 Mo. 531, 24 Am. St. R. 351. Note,
132 Am. St. R
.
571. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v
. Cummings, – Ore. —, 133 Pac.
1169, 4
7
L. R
.
A
.
N. S
.
252.
* Conyngton, Corporate Organization, Form 62.
* Sears, Trust Estates, etc., p. 287.
* Public Acts, Mich. 1907, No. 101, p. 119.
* Public Acts, Mich. 1913, No. 164, p. 286.
as to make the beneficiaries partners, all their names would have to
be given. This however should and can be avoided. Such state
ments as the above are generally required in annual reports of cor
porations, and are not more onerous than they are.
Corporate Domicile:
I have already referred to the uncertainty of the statutory provis
ions relating to place or location. Where the New Hampshire stat
ute provided that the incorporation paper should state the “place
in which it
s
business is to be carried on,” and the paper drawn b
y
a supposedly competent attorney, stated “the places o
f
business
were Nashua in New Hampshire, and East Brookfield, in Massa
chusetts,” and the manufacturing business was done a
t
East Brook
field, and the corporate meetings held a
t Nashua, the Massachu
setts Supreme Judicial Court, held there was no corporation de jure,
d
e facto, o
r b
y
estoppel, and the treasurer was individually liable
on a note given as the corporation's note." So too corporations are
frequently dissolved for failure to maintain a domiciliary office in
the incorporating state, whether the statute so requires o
r
not. It
was formerly held that corporate stockholders' meetings could not
lawfully be held outside o
f
the creating state because in the very
nature o
f things the incorporating statute conferring such a privilege
o
r franchise, is necessarily inoperative beyond such state, and out
side o
f
such state the assembled stockholders are possessed o
f only
their natural powers." This doctrine is gradually passing away,
and in the absence o
f statutory provisions controlling, and with pro
visions in the incorporation paper so authorizing, it is now reas
onably safe to hold shareholders meetings outside the creating
state." However there are so many conflicting decisions and statu
tory provisions that it is never wise to advise such to be done."
Trust Domicile:
Upon the other hand since Trustees act not under any special
privilege o
r
franchise from the state, but under their common law
and constitutional right a
s
citizens o
f
one state to d
o
business there
* Montgomery v. Forbes, (1889) 148 Mass. 249, 19 N. E. 342, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 594.
* Frost, Incorporation and Org. of Corp., pp. 64, 65 (4th Ed.).* Miller v. Ewer (1847) 27 Me. 509, 46 Am. Dec. 619, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 841.
1
6
7
Missouri Lead etc. Co. v
.
Reinhard (1893) 114 Mo. 218, 3
5
Am. St. R
. 746, 1
Wilgus, Cases, 844; Graham v
.
Boston etc. R
.
R
.
(1886) 118 U
.
S
. 161, 1 Wilgus, Cases,
846, note p
.
847.
* Machen, Corp. § 1212.
or in another, there is no difficulty as to “place of business,” and no
place of business~ is usually stated, further than to designate the city
in which annual or other meetings are to be held. Here again the
Trust is simpler?“°
'
.
Corporate Purposes:
Incorporation statutes frequently provide for incorporation “for
any lawful purpose” with certain exceptions, usually of a public
service character. There is frequent difficulty in determining wheth
er two or more purposes can be joined in one incorporation paper;
the statutes in some states expressly authorize this; in some states
the state officials so construe their ambiguous statutes; in others the
statutes divide business into classes, which cannot be joined; in still
other states only one purpose or general object can be claimed;
while in still others, the name of the corporation must indicate the
various purposes. This serves to indicate the confusion, and the
difficulty encountered here."° This is mitigated however somewhat
by the rule that things that cannot be properly claimed are mere
surplusage, and can be rejected. This however would not help
out an incorporation paper where two objects are joined when only
one is permitted, but either of which would be valid if standing
alone. Perhaps the corporation would be permitted to elect, and
amend the paper, and thereafter carry on the one line of business
elected. In any event the “object” clauses of an important corpor
ation paper requires special skill and care in drawing.
Trust Purposes:
There seems to be no such difficulty, or in fact no such limitations,
applying to Trusts. They can be created to carry on any lawful
business or businesses desired, one or many as the parties, the declar
ants and the trustees provide for, unless there are express statutory
limitations. They have been created for manufacturing, mining,
lumbering, agriculture, transportation, mercantile, real estate, hold
ing shares, disposing of patents, and numerous other purposes?"
And as we saw above “Every kind of valuable property, both real
and personal, that can be assigned at law may be the subject-matter
of a Trust.“” Here again with equal attention the purposes for
which a Trust may be formed may be more certainly provided for
than in similar incorporation papers.
'°° See Forms, given in Sears, Cook (Corp.) and Conyngton (Corp. Organization).
"" Frost, Incorp. and Organ. Corps., p. 19 ct seq.; Machen, Corps., §§ 46-108.
Y“ Sears, Trust Estates etc., p. 253.
‘"* Perry, Trusts, 6th Ed., § 67.
For instance in the Massachusetts Gas Companies, the declara
tion of trust authorized its trustees to engage: (I) in manufacturing,
buying, selling and dealing in coal, oil, coke, gas and all products
thereof: (2) in manufacturing and supplying gas or electricity or
any other agent for light, heat, power or other purposes; (3) in ac
quiring, owning, managing, exchanging, selling and dealing in the
stocks, shares and securities of corporations, trusts or associations,
engaged in whole or in part in any business above mentioned, or
in owning and operating railways or railroads or transporting pas
sengers, merchandise, mails or express matter, or in manufacturing,
selling or repairing machines, equipments supplies or other articles
used by corporations, trusts or associations of any of the classes
above mentioned. * * * * (4) in any business similar in character to
that above mentioned which the trustees may deem expedient.” and
to acquire, hold and dispose of the stocks of such institutions.“
Corporate Stock:
The theory of the capital stock of a corporation is that the power
to have such, or increase or decrease it, is a corporate franchise,
and must be expressly conferred by the state, or otherwise it does not
exist?“ Incorporation statutes frequently fix maximum and mini
mum limits, and sometimes limit indebtedness to the amount of capi
tal stock, also special provisions are almost always made in reference
to increase or decrease of the same, otherwise unanimous consent
of shareholders, as well as the consent of the state would be neces
sary."" Under all the incorporation laws, the incorporation paper
must state the number of shares, and the par value thereof (except
now in New York) and these cannot be changed except by an
amendment made to the articles of incorporation. In the absence
of statutory provisions preventing, in the original organization of
the company, preferred and common stock may be provided for in
the incorporation paper, but not so afterward except by uanimous
consent. unless there are statutory provisions making other regula
tions.""' In several states as in Michigan the statutes provide for
a certain kind of redeemable preferred stock with a limited dividend;
in such states other kinds of preferred stock, or with greater divi
dends cannot be provided for. In some states the statute, because
1" Sears, Trust Estates, p. 303.
1'“Cooke v. Marshall (1899) 191 Pa. St. 315, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 761.
1" Railway Co. v. Allerton (1873) 85 U. S. (18 Wall.) 233, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 442,
note 763.
1" Kel-it v. Quicksilver Mining Co. (1879) 78 N. Y. 159, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 790,- note
793; Campbell v. Zylonite Co. 121 N. Y. 455.
the common law was otherwise, expressly provides “that each share
holder shall be entitled to one vote for each share held.” In such
a state can non-voting preferred shares be created? This is answer
ed differently in different jurisdictions?" In some states there is
a statutory liability attaching to the ownership of stock, and our
Supreme Court has just held that when a corporation organized in
one state having no such statutory liability, is expressly authorized
to do business in a state having such liability the shareholders be
come liable thereon for business done in such state?" This makes
stock holding in corporations organized to do business throughout
the United States a precarious matter.
Trust Stock :
How is it with Express Trusts? Can they be created with a cap
ital stock represented by transferable shares? Or can the property
held in trust by the trustees be represented by shares issued by the
trustees, transferable, so as to give purchasers the same rights as
original beneficiaries?
There is no doubt now, but that at Common Law, under merely
their power to contract, individuals may between themselves engage
in business together, each contributing property thereto, and take
certificates representing their interests, which they may if the agree
ment so provides transfer to others. For I00 years or so, 1720 to
1825, the English Bubble Act forbade this, but this was repealed in
England, and was never, or if at all, only to a very limited extent
in force in this country. The courts in this country have held
from the beginning that this could be done,"° and now hold, that
although by constitutional provisions “corporations can be created
only under general laws” and corporation is defined in the constitu
tion to “include all associations and joint stock companies having
any of the powers and privileges of corporations not possessed by
individuals or partnerships,” and there is no statute authorizing the
creation of joint stock companies with transferable shares, still,
such institutions can be created by contract among
individuals under
the exercise of their common law rights and not be corporations.
Such was the holding in a well considered Idaho case, following
many similar decisions in other states.“‘° There is therefore no law
against doing this. Still further we have already seen that the in
1" State v. Swanger, 190 Mo. 561, 89 S. W. 892; Colonist Printing etc. Co. v. Duns
muir, 32 Can. Sup. Ct. 679.
1" Thomas v. Matthiessen (1913) 232 U. S. 221.
1" 1 Wilgus, Cases, note p. 175. Sears, Trust Estates, N 52-54.
“° Spottswood v. Morris (1906) 12 Id. 360, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 665, 85 Pac. 1094.
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terest of a beneficiary is substantially a property right inheritable,
descendible, and transferable as other rights are. The 9th section
of the English Statute of Frauds required an assignment to be in
writing; and since the beneficiaries' rights are not those of joint or
co-tenants in the trust fund, but wholly incorporeal and intangible,
just what the trust declared provides, the most natural way to rep
resent them is by a certificate, and the most natural and convenient
way of transfer is by an assignment of the certificate. In Estate of
Oliver, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, held that the interest of
the stockholder “was an interest in the profits made. He had no
title to the land bought by the trustees for the company, as a tenant
in common or otherwise and could neither convey nor encumber it
.
His interest in it was personal estate and the extent of that interest
was shown by his cerificate o
f stock.”
The following are illustrations o
f
the stock provisions in a few
Trusts:— -
“Central Massachusetts Light and Power Co. The beneficial in
terest in the trust created b
y
it
s agreement and declaration o
f
trust
is divided into 6,500 preferred shares and 6,500 common shares.
The latter have no par value. The former have a par value o
f
$100, are entitled to cumulative preferred dividends o
f
5 per cent
the first year and increasing thereafter yearly to 6 per cent after
May 15, 1918. The preferred shares have a preference in liquida
tion and are entitled to $11o if the trust is terminated within two
years, and to amounts increasing thereafter yearly up to $125 if the
termination occurs after May 15, 1918.”
The Worcester Railways and Investment Company issued “nego
tiable certificates or evidences o
f
interest for 60,000 shares, each
share representing a fractional beneficial interest o
f
1/60000 in"
it
s property, the trustees having discretion to fix the dividends there
On.188 *
The capital o
f
the Massachusetts Light and Traction Companies,
is “divided into 100,000 shares o
f
the par value o
f
$1.00 each,
bearing 5 per cent. non-cumulative dividends, to be designated a
s
“preferred A stock,” 50,000 shares of the par value of $5.00 each,
bearing 6 per cent. non-cumulative dividends, to be designated “pre
ferred B stock,” and 10,000 shares o
f
the par value o
f
$25,000, o
f
common stock.”
* Oliver’s Estate (1890) 136 Pa. 43, 20 Am. St. R. 894.
* Report (No. 1788 House) of Special Commission, Mass., on Voluntary Associa
tions (1913) p
.
40.
* Ib. p. 20.
* Ib. p. 44.
___4I._.
It would seem again here that the Express Trust is much more
flexible than the usual corporation provisions are in reference to
shares, there being no state to interfere, or statute to follow, and the
whole matter can be moulded to suit the parties, and may be changed
in any way or at any time, in accordance with such provisions as may
be inserted in the trust agreement. The only point of difficulty here
is in reference to partnership liability, a matter which is considered
later on.
Corporate Directors:
Statutes usually require the number to be stated, and when once
fixed can be changed only by an amendment regularly adopted.
Statutes also usually require them to be shareholders to the extent
of a few shares. Being elected there is no power of removal, unless
expressly provided for in the statute, incorporation paper, or by
laws. By perhaps all business corporation statutes there must be
directors, and in them the ordinary powers of the corporation are
vested?“ They however have no legal or equitable title to the cor
porate property. They act only in duly called meetings?“ Their
functions are sui generis, and have been likened to those of agents,
trustees or mandatories of the corporation, but perhaps they are
strictly neither.“° Directors, however, are not agents of the share
holders, and except in certain peculiar situations are not generally
said to be in a position of trust toward them?” Courts are not in
accord upon the degree of care and diligence required of directors,
one line of authorities saying that the care and diligence that an
ordinarily prudent man takes of his own business, is required,
while another line of authorities says, since they get no pay, no
greater care is required than that required of a gratuitous bailee."°
They have no authority to sell or dispose of the corporate capital or
property, except such as is properly done in the ordinary course of
business. For defaults of the directors affecting all the share
holders alike, they are primarily liable only to the corporation, and
1“ In the Matter of Election of Directors, 63 N. J. L. 168, 2 Wilgus, Cases, p. 1744.
1*“Blood v. La Serena, H3 Cal. 221; Metropolitan Elev. R. R. C0. v. Manhattan El.
Ry. Co. (1884) 11 Daly (N. Y.) 373, 1 \\"ilgus, Cases, 694, note 702.
"" Bank of Little Rock v. McCarthy (1892) 55 Ark. 473, 29 Am. St. R. 60, 1 Wilgus,
Cases, note 850.
*” Allen v. Curtis (1857) 26 Conn. 456, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1727; Ellis v. Ward (1890)
137 Ill. 509, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1729; VVallacc v. Lincoln Sav. Bank (1891) 89 Tenn. 630,
24 Am. St. R. 625, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1731.
1“ See “Purchase of Shares of Corporation by a Director from a Shareholder," by
H. L. Wilgus, 8 Mich. Law Rev. (Feby. 1910) p. 267.
1" North Hudson Building & Loan Assn. v. Childs (1892) 82 Wis. 460, 33 Am. St.
R. 57, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1737. See also 2 \\'ilgus, Cases, pp. 1874-1888.
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only when they so control the corporation as to prevent it from
bringing a proper action to protect itself amounting to a substantial
breach of trust, can the shareholder bring a representative suit in
equity to prevent a failure of justice. Courts of equity have no
special jurisdiction over directors merely as such. It is only when
there is a breach of trust upon their part, that they can be called to
account in equity.”
Trustees of Trusts:
In case of the Trust, the Trustees stand, so far as control and
management are concerned, if the Trust agreement so provides, in
a position somewhat analogous to that of directors in a corporation.
They, however, exercise control, because they are the owners of
the property, and not the agents of the beneficiaries, or of any one
else. They act as owners, but as owners that are obliged to render
an account in equity not merely to all the beneficiaries as a whole,
but to each and every beneficiary; for the beneficiary's right is in
dividual, and in personam, and enforceable in equity primarily,
not secondarily, against the trustee.”
A trustee has whatever estate either legal or equitable is neces
sary for him fully to carry out the trust created but no further;”
and (1) “A trustee is bound to do anything that he is expressly bid
den to do by the instrument creating the trust. (2) A trustee may
safely do anything that he is expressly authorized to do by that in
strument, even loan or invest money without adequate security.
(3) A trustee is bound to refrain from doing anything that is ex
pressly forbidden by that instrument. (4) Within these limits a
trustee must play the part of a prudent owner and a prudent man
of business,” not as if he had himself alone to consider, but also
“for the benefit of other people for whom he felt morally bound to
provide.”
Upon the other hand, however, just because the trustee is owner
of the property, if the trustee dies intestate his estate devolves upon
his heir or personal representative if he had a fee; so also he can
devise the estate, or convey it inter vivos,” in fact “At law the
trustee has all those powers of alienating inter vivos, mortgaging and
1
st Dodge v
. Woolsey (1855) 5
9 U. S. (18 How.) 331, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 88; Hawes
v
.
Oakland (1881) 104 U. S
. 450, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1716.
* Ames, Cases, pp. 235-278.
* Reichert v. Missouri & Ill. Co. (1907) 231 Ill. 238, 121 Am. St. R. 307, 83
N. E. 166.
* Maitland, Equity, p. 98; Cook, Trusts & Trustees, § 127; Whiteley v. Learoyd,
33 Ch. D
. 355, 1
2
A. C
. 722, 2
5 Eng. Rul. Cas. 326.
* Maitland, Equity, pp. 86-90.
so forth that he would have were there no trust in existence,” but
of course any heir, devisee, executor, administrator or party taking
with notice is bound by the trust. To prevent these results several
trustees are appointed to hold as joint—tenants, with its attendant
survivorship?°°
Unlike directors the act of a majority of trustees does not bind the
minority,‘ all must join in a conveyance, or‘ in a receipt. They are
not at all agents for one another, nor can one shelter himself by
saying he was out voted, if he, nevertheless, acquiesced in the
action taken.“" Of course, however all of these matters can be
modified to suit the wishes of the settlor.
The following from the declaration of trust of the Massachusetts
Gas Companies,-a manufacturing trust,—indicates what may be
done?”
“The trustees shall hold the legal title to all property at any time
belonging to this trust, and subject only to the specific limitations
herein contained, they shall have the absolute control of the conduct
of all business of the trust; and the following enumeration of spe
cific duties and powers shall not be construed in anyway as a limi
tation upon the general powers intended to be conferred upon them.
“The Trustees shall have authority to adopt and use a common
seal; to make all such contracts as they may deem expedient in the
conduct of business of the trust; from time to time to release, sell,
exchange, or otherwise dispose of, at public or private sale, any or
all of the trust property, whether real or personal, for such prices
either in cash or the stocks, shares, or securities of other corpora
tions, trusts or associations and upon such terms as to credit or oth
erwise as they may deem expedient; to guarantee or assume the ob
ligations of other corporations, trusts or associations and to enter
into such agreements by way of indemnity or otherwise as they may
deem expedient in connection with the acquisition of property from
the subscribers as hereinbefore provided or otherwise; to confer,
by way of substitution, such power and authority on the President,
Treasurer, Secretary, and Executive Committee, and other officers
and agents appointed by them, as they may deem expedient; to bor
row money for the purposes of the trust and give the obligations of
the Trustees therefor; to loan any money from time to time in the
1"‘Maitland, Equity, p. 93.
"" Reichcrt v. Missouri etc. Coal Co. (1907) 231 Ill. 238, 121 Am. St. R. 307, 83
N. E. 166; Mattison v. Mattison (1909) 53 Ore. 254, 100 Pac. 4, 133 Am. St. R. 829;
Adams’ Estate (1903) 221 Pa. 77, 70 Atl. 438, 128 Am. St. R. 727, Estate of Fesmire, 134
Pa. St. 67, 19 Am. St. 676.
“"' Sears, Trust Estates etc., p. 303.
.
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hands of the Trustees, with or without security, on such terms as
they may deem expedient; to subscribe for, acquire, own, sell or oth
erwise dispose of such real or personal property including the stocks,
shares, and securities of any other corporations, trusts, or associa
tions, as they may deem expedient in connection with the purposes of
the trust; to vote in person or by proxy on all shares of stock at
any time held by them, and to collect and receive the income, interest,
and profits of any such stock or securities; to collect, sue for, re
ceive, and receipt for all sums of money at any time becoming due
to said trust; to employ counsel and to begin, prosecute, defend, and
settle suits at law, in equity or otherwise, and to compromise or re
fer to arbitration any claims in favor of or against the trust; and in
general to do all such matters and things as in their judgment will
promote or advance the business which they are authorized to carry
on, although such matters and things may be neither specifically
authorized nor incidental to any matters or things specifically author
ized. In addition to the powers herein granted the Trustees shall
have all power with reference to the conduct of the business and
management of the property of the trust which are possessed by
directors of a manufacturing corporation under the laws of Massa
chusetts.
“So far as strangers to the trust are concerned a resolution of the
Trustees authorizing a particular act to be done shall be conclusive
evidence in favor of strangers that such act is within the power
of the Trustees; and no purchaser from the Trustees sh_all be
bound to see to the application of the purchase money or other con
sideration paid or delivered by or for said purchaser to or from the
Trustees.
“Stated meetings of the Trustees shall be held at least once a
month, and other meetings shall be held from time to time upon the
call of the President or any three of the Trustees. A majority of
the Trustees shall constitute a quorum; and the concurrence of all
the Trustees shall not be necessary to the validity of any action
taken by them, but the decision expressed by a vote of a majority of
the Trustees present and voting at any meeting shall be conclusive.”
Other provisions authorize the adoption of by—laws, election of
ofiicers, and executive committee, and agents, accepting resignations,
removing officers, filling vacancies, keeping records, etc.
Also “The Trustees shall not be liable for any error of judgment
or for any loss arising out of any act or omission in the execution
of this trust, so long as they act in good faith, nor shall they be per
sonally liable for the acts or omissions of each other, or for the acts
or omissions of any officer, agent, or servant elected or appointed by
‘__._ -
or acting for them; and they shall not be obliged to give any bond to
secure the due performance of this trust by them.
“Any Trustee may acquire, own, and dispose of shares in this trust
to the same extent as if he were not a Trustee."
Corporate Life or Duration:
VV e have seen that corporations were often said to be immortal.
This of course meant that there was continuous or perpetual suc
cession for an indefinite and unlimited time unless the corporation
was dissolved in some of the ways known to the law,——loss of all
members, act of Parliament, surrender of franchises, or quo war
ranto for misuser or non—user?“" This is still the law, unless there
are constitutional or statutory provisions to the contrary, but there
are such in nearly ever state, the limit fixed being usually from 20
to 50 years, and in many cases the proposed duration must be stated
in the Incorporation Paper. In many states a renewal may be had
for a like period. With us the Legislature has no right to dissolve
unless the power to do so is reserved to the State?°° However,
through quo warranto proceedings for violation of duty injurious
ly affecting the public, the courts may pronounce judgment of dis
solution?“ During the whole of its prescribed life, the corporation
is said to have perpetual or continuous succession, and remains the
same corporation regardless of any change in membership.
Trust Duration:
In this respect, because of the “rule against perpetuities,” the
corporate organization seems simpler than the Trust form. This
rule in all its applications is exceedingly intricate and technical, and
frequently papers, especially wills, drawn by the best lawyers have
contained provisions that have been rendered ineffective because
offending against the rule. In the matter of an ordinary business
trust, however, while perhaps a perpetual or immortal existence can
not be acquired, an existence that is as long as or in many cases
much longer than the ordinary corporate life can be obtained.
The English rule seems to have two branches, one relating to the
vesting of future estates, and the other to trusts for accumulations.
These may be stated: (1) “Every future contingent estate limited
1" State v. Payne (1895) 129 Mo. 468, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 830; Boston Glass Manufac
tory v. Langdon (1834) 24 Pick. (Mass) 49, 35 Am. Dec. 292, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 866.
"Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819), 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518, 1
Wilgus, Cases, 708.
3°‘People v. Dashaway Association (1890) S4 Cal. 114, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1298.
to arise on an event that might possibly happen later than 21 years
and the period of gestation after the death of persons living
at the creation of the estate is void the day it is created.” (2)
“Where property, real and personal, is given to trustees to hold and
to receive and invest the rents and profits of the real property and
the income of the personal property, and to deliver the property and
income at a certain or contingent future time to the beneficiaries, if
that time may possibly happen more than 21 years and the period of
gestation after the death of persons living at the creation of the trust,
the direction to accumulate and the gift of the accumulated fund are
void absolutely.”
Neither of these rules would seem to prevent the creation of trusts
for indefinite periods, as A grants property to B in fee to control
and manage for C in fee, for each estate, the legal and equitable,
is vested in the respective parties, and they together may at any time
if they choose terminate the trust, and together convey an absolute
title to the property."
A recent writer however has said “The courts in this country
seem to be moving very rapidly toward the general announcement of
the rule that trusts of absolute indestructible equitable interests can
not be made to last for longer than lives in being and twenty one
years, and that any provision which may by any possibility postpone
the term of the trusteeship for longer than that period is wholly void
from the beginning.”
It has been held in Illinois that where the trustees have the abso
lute power to sell at any time free of the rights of the beneficiaries,
the rule does not apply;" and likewise in Massachusetts, if the in
come is not to be accumulated, but distributed as it accrues, and
where the whole equitable interest is at every moment vested abso
lutely in the shareholders, and can be sold by them at any time, the
rule does not apply;” but if the trustees and beneficiaries cannot
together convey the complete title without violating the trust, the
rule is violated.” -
In New York the statute provides that “Every future estate shall
be void in it
s
creation which shall suspend the absolute power o
f
alienation for a longer period than two lives in being. * * * Such
* Rood, History of Real Property Law, § 27.
* 18 Am. & Eng. Encyc. (1st Ed.) pp. 381-382.* Gray, J. C., Rule against Perpetuities, 2d Ed. (1906) $ 236.
* Kales, Transfer of Title to Real Estate, § 72.
* Hart v. Seymour (1893) 147 Ill. 598.
* Howe v. Morse (1899) 174 Mass. 491, 55 N. E. 213.
* Winsor v. Mills (1892), 157 Mass. 362; Young v. Snow (1897) 167 Mass. 287.
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power of alienation is suspended when there are no persons in
being by whom an absolute fee in possession can be conveyed.”
Under this statute it has been held that if the trust term is longer
than the period of two lives in being, but the trustees have at al
l
times the power to convey the complete title neither the rule nor
statute is violated.” And where the trust is for the sole benefit of
the settlors o
r
their appointees, the rule does not apply, even though
the beneficiaries are infants, o
r
are numerous, and the entire inter
est cannot be disposed o
f
without their consent."
In New York, Michigan and Minnesota, the period seems to be
two lives only; in Wisconsin, two lives and 20 years; in California,
Idaho, North and South Dakota, the period is fixed b
y
lives, in
being a
t
the creation, but there is no limitation as to number; in all
other states the period is a “life or lives in being and 21 years there
after.” The lives specified may be those of trustees, existing
beneficiaries o
r strangers.”
The following are illustrations: The term o
f
the Boston and Wor
cester Electric Companies is “twenty years after the death o
f
the
last survivor o
f
2
7 persons named in the agreement and declara
tion.” In the Massachusetts Electric Companies “The trust is
to continue for the term o
f
2
1 years from the date o
f
the agree
ment, unless the holders of at least two thirds o
f
the shares then
outstanding shall a
t
a meeting called for that purpose vote for its
termination or continuance.” The Massachusetts Northern Rail
ways put it
:
“The trust is to continue for the term o
f twenty years
after the death o
f
the last survivor o
f
ten persons” named, six o
f
whom were the sons and daughters o
f
the other four, three o
f
whom
were trustees; but a
t any time b
y
a vote o
f
2/3 o
f
the outstanding
shares in a meeting called for the purpose, confirmed by the vote o
f
5/7 o
f
the trustees, the trust can be terminated, and the property be
distributed, o
r
b
e sold and proceeds distributed.”
As has been pointed out a succession o
f
trustees can be kept up
b
y
means o
f joint tenancies, or b
y provisions in the trust-deed, o
r
if necessary to prevent failure by appointment of a court of equity,
* Robert v. Corning (1882) 89 N. Y. 225; Henderson v. Henderson (1889) 113
N. Y. 1.
*"Beardsley v
.
Hotchkiss (1884) 9
6
N. Y. 201; N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Livingston
(1892) 133 N. Y. 125; Hope v. Brewer (1892) 136 N. Y. 126; Holmes v. Walter (1903)
118 Wis. 409; Williams v
. Montgomery (1896) 148 N. Y. 519.
* Sears, Trust Estates etc., pp. 137-138.
* Crooke v. King's County (1884) 97 N. Y. 421; Bailey v. Bailey (1884) 97 N. Y.
460. - .
* Report of Special Committee of Mass. House Reps. No. 1788, p. 7.
* Ib. p. 8.
* Ib. p. 15.
___ 43 _
for it is a maxim that a trust shall not fail for want of a trustee.”
So too if there is not a special confidence in the person, instead of in
the office. of the trustee, no additional conveyances are necessary
to keep up the succession of powers, rights and duties in the
trustees?"
A little care in the drawing up the trust instrument may make
the trust as convenient in this regard as the corporation?"
This brings us to a consideration of the corporation and trust
obligations and liabilities. Here are important differences, in theory,
and great care is necessary in drawing trust agreements or there is
danger of unexpected or unusual liabilities.
Corporation Liabilities.
It results, of course, that because a corporation is a separate
person in the law, that its rights and obligations are its own, and not
those of any other persons. And this doctrine obtains universally
except when this corporate personality is used to “defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime.”"°
It follows of course that if the corporation is properly organized,
and the shareholders and officers do all they should do, and do
nothing they should not do, no one is liable except the corporation
for any obligations incurred. The theory is that the creditor must
look to the capital stock of the corporation for his protection; and
this capital stock is frequently called a “trust fund” for the protec
tion of creditors?” Yet this trust fund doctrine has been bitterly
assailed, and it is held there is no liability on olficers and share
holders, in the absence of statutory provisions, unless there is
actual or constructive fraud, or ultra vires, or tortious or illegal acts
upon their part?“ Of course it is agreed that if there is a trust
fund, it is peculiar, unlike ordinary trust funds, since there is no
2" Reichert v. Mission etc. Coal Co. (1907) 231 Ill. 238, 121 Am. St. R. 307; Dodge
v. Dodge (1908) 109 Md. 164, 71 Atl. 519, 13o Am. St. R. 503, note 508; Smith v.
Davis (1891) 90 Cal. 25, 25 Am. St. R. 92; U. S. Casualty Co. v. Kacer (1902) 169
Mo. 301, 69 S. W. 370, 92 Am. St. R. 641.
2" Kadis v. Weil (1913) 164 N. C. 84, 80 S. E. 229. Compare Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Safe Deposit Co. (1911) 115 Md. 339, Ann. Cas. 1913 A 1279, note.
"5 See Forms given in Sears, Cook (Corp. 7th Ed.), Conyngton (Corp. Organ.).
21'Smith v. Moore (1912) 199 Fed. 689. See also 10 Mich. Law Rev. 310; 12 Col.
Law Rev. 496.
“Wood v. Dummer (1824) 3 Mason 308, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1847; Scovill v. Thayer
(1881) 105 U. S. 143, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1907; Shields v. Hobart (1903) 172 Mo. 491, 95
Am. St. R. 529, 72 S. W. 669.
’1‘O'Bear Jewelry Co. v. Volfer (1894) 106 Ala. 205, 54 Am. St. R. 31, 2 Wilgus,
Cases, 1852; Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. Co. (1892) 4,8 Minn. 174, 2 Wilgus, Cases,
1911; Hall v. Henderson (1900) 134 Ala. 455, 63 L. R. A. 673.
separation of the legal and equitable titles, and no special trusts and
confidence existing between the corporation, corporate officers, or
shareholders, and corporate creditors. The corporation owns the
whole title legal and equitable to corporate property and the creditor
has, merely as such, no lien upon it either at law or in equity, at
least before insolvency.” And so it is held by the great weight of
authority (in the absence of bankruptcy laws forbidding) that a
corporation can lawfully prefer it
s creditors, even stockholder and
director creditors, if it chooses, and there is no actual fraud.”
Nevertheless it is to a fund designated capital, o
r capital stock,
and to that only, that créditors can look for protection. There is
however much confusion as to exactly what is included in this
fund. It perhaps can now be safely said to include all the corporate
property, real, and personal, tangible and intangible, choses in
possession and in action, u
p
to an amount equal to the face value o
f
the outstanding stock, but yet not to that extent, if the corporate
capital has been dissipated b
y
misfortune, and not b
y
fault o
f re
sponsible parties.”
There is however yet some uncertainty as to holding shareholders
liable for unpaid stock, or for stock issued for overvalued property,
o
r for dividends paid out o
f corporate capital. -
New York has just held that under the law of that state share
holders in the absence o
f
an agreement to pay up their stock, can
not be held by creditors to pay up.” As to payment of stock by
property, one line o
f
authorities holds that in the absence o
f
actual
fraud, established b
y
the complainant, the judgment o
f
the direc
tors is final,” as where the three dummy incorporators and direc
tors holding $3,000 o
f
stock in the U. S. Steel Corporation, under
the New Jersey law passed a resolution that the property proposed
to be turned over to the company was equal in value to the face
value o
f
the stock and bonds, $1,410,000,000 to be issued for it
.
The Government experts however think there was $700,000,000
water in it
.
Another view is that it is only a question o
f
fact to
b
e determined b
y
a jury when the question is submitted to them
upon the facts put before them, and good faith will not protect;
* Hollins v. Brierfield Coal Co. (1893) 150 U. S. 371, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1868.
* Catlin v. Eagle Bank (1826) 6 Conn. 233, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1815; Corey v. Wads
worth (1897) 118 Ala. 488, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1836. Compare Rouse v
.
Merchants Natl.
Bank (1889) 46 O. S
. 493, 1
5
Am. St. R
. 644, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1819; Olney v
.
Conanicut
Land Co. (1889) 1
6
R
.
I. 597, 27 Am. St. R
. 767, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1832.
* Am. Life and Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ferguson (1913)) 66 Ore. 417, 134 Pac. 1029; In
re Wells Estate (1913) 156 Wis. 294, 144 N. W. 174.
* Southworth v. Morgan (1912) 205 N. Y. 293.
* Graves v. Brooks (1898) 1 17 Mich. 424, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1950.
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another rule is that a large difference in the actual value of the
property and the face value of the stock issued is prima facie evi
dence of fraud and calls for explanation;” and still another view
is that if the corporation is a “going concern,” but nearly “gone,”
stock may be issued at a discount to takers in order to see, if per
chance, it may be revived, at the expense of subsequent creditors.”
So, too, while it was originally held that the directors could not pay
dividends to shareholders out of the corporate capital, yet our Su
preme Court has held that where shareholders receive such dividends
in good faith, supposing they were properly declared and paid out of
profits instead of capital they may keep them,” and the creditor
must whistle through the corporate whistle to the defaulting direc
tors to make good their loss.
Then too there are statutory efforts to protect creditors, which
for the most part are satisfactory to nobody. These are attempts
to make officers and stockholders liable for corporate debts under
such varying circumstances that it is difficult to tell what the liability
is
,
whether penal o
r contractual,” primary o
r secondary,”, limited
o
r unlimited, separate o
r joint, o
r
on prior, existing, o
r subsequent
shareholders,” and whether enforceable outside of the state or
not.” So too many states provide that all “fictitious issues o
f
stock
o
r
bonds shall b
e void,” yet courts have had great difficulty in giving
effect to such provisions, for if the effort to issue stock at a dis
count is void, the statute would then hurt creditors more than in any
other way, and defeat its own probable purpose.” On the other
hand Montana has a statute that provides that stock may b
e issued
for mining property taken a
t any value, and such stock shall b
e
deemed to b
e wholly paid up.”
* See cases cited in State Trust Co. v. Turner (1900) 111 Ia. 664, 82 N. W. 1029, 53
L. R
.
A
. 136, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1953. Compare 1 Cook, Corp., §§ 46-47.
* Handley v. Stutz (1891) 139 U. S. 417, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1923.
* McDonald v. Williams (1899) 174 U. S. 397, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1981.
* Wiles v. Suydam (1876) 64 N. Y. 173, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1981.
* Umsted v. Buskirk (1866) 17 O. S. 113, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1990.
* Hanson v. Donkersley (1877) 37 Mich. 184, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1997.
* Harger v. McCullough (1846) 2 Denio (N. Y.) 19, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1998; Bank
o
f Poughkeepsie v
.
Ibbotson (1840) 2
4
Wend. (N. Y.) 473, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 2001;
Foot v
.
Sinnock (1887) 12o Ill. 350, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 2003; Zang v
. Wyant (1898) 2
5
Colo. 551, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 2005.* Marshall v. Sherman (1895) 148 N. Y. 9, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 2021; Howarth v.
Angle (1900) 162 N. Y. 179, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 2028; Whitman v
.
Oxford Bank (1900)
176 U. S
. 559, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 2018.
* Van Cleve v. Berkey (1898) 143 Mo. 109, 42 L. R. A. 593, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1953.
Compare 1 Cook, Corp., § 47.
* Civil Code of Montana, § 3824, (Mar. 7, 1895).
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Trust Liabilities.
(a) Trustees liability: As has been pointed out, in a Trust, the
trustees are the owners of the property to the extent of any estate
necessary for them to have under the instrument of trust to enable
them fully to execute it
. If it therefore gives to them full control,
management, and disposition o
f
the property, they acts as owners
do, a
s principals and not as agents o
f
others.” It would naturally
follow from this that they bind themselves personally and themselves
alone, in the absence o
f
some provision to the contrary. The debts
they incur are their personal debts, not those o
f
the beneficiaries,
nor of the trust fund.*
As was said b
y
the United States Supreme Court in Taylor v.
Davis,” “When an agent contracts in the name of his principal,
the principal contracts and is bound, but the agent is not. When a
trustee contracts as such, unless he is bound no one is bound for
h
e has no principal. The trust estate cannot promise; the contract
is therefore the personal undertaking o
f
the trustee. As a trustee
holds the estate, although only with the power and for the purpose
o
f managing it
,
h
e is personally bound b
y
the contracts he makes as
trustee, even when designating himself as such. * * * Of course
when a trustee acts in good faith for the benefit o
f
the trust he is
entitled to indemnity himself for his engagements out o
f
the estate
in his hands.” As for instance where a broker secured a loan for
the trustee for the benefit o
f
the estate, the trustee promising to
pay the commission out o
f
the trust fund, it was held that the trust
estate was not liable, but the trustee was personally.” And so
where a note signed b
y
A
.
B
. Trustee, was taken b
y
the payee with
knowledge that it was for the benefit o
f
the estate, yet the trustee
was held personally liable.” Hill on Trustees states the rule “A
trustee who carries on any trade with the trust assets for the benefit
o
f
the cestuis que trust will be responsible to the creditors, not only
to the extent of the trust assets but also with the whole of his own
* Loring, Trustees Handbook, pp. 25-29; Ames, Cases, 2d Ed., pp. 278-281; Ken
meson, Cases, pp. 147-152.
* Loring, Trustees Handbook, pp. 29-31; Dunlevie v. Spangenberg (1910) 121 -
N. Y. S. 299, 66 Misc. 354.
* Taylor v. Davis (1884) 11o U. S. 330, 335. -* Johnson v. Leman (1890) 131 Ill. 609, 19 Am. St. R. 63, note 67; Connally v.
Lyons (1891) 8
2
Tex. 664, 2
7
Am. St. R
. 935; McIntyre v. Williamson (1900) 72 Vt. 183,
47 Atl. 786, 82 Am. St. R, 929.
* Roger Williams Natl. Bank v. Groton Mfg. Co. (1889) 16 R. I. 504; Mitchell &
Co. v
.
Whitlock (1897) 121 N. C
.
166.
* Hill, Trustees (Ed. 1846) p. 533; Woddrop v. Weed (1893) 154 Pa. St. 307, 35 Am.
St. R
.
832. But see Wright v. Railroad Co. (1909) 151 N. C
. 529; Curry v
.
Dorr (1912)
21o Mass. 430, on 432.
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property, and he may be made bankrupt and proceeded against in the
same manner as any other trader, and it is immaterial that the trade
is carried on by him in consequence of an express direction in the
trust instrument; although the trust property will doubtless be
primarily liable to creditors, and will be first applied so far as it
will go in discharge of the liabilities.”
This of course is directly contrary to the liability of corporate
directors, and is so different that, if it could not be modified it would
deter competent business men from accepting such trusts. Can a
trustee then exclude such liability by express stipulation to the con
trary? It is clear he can. In Shoe and Leather Bank v. Wood,”
it was held that there was not personal liability upon the trustees
where they had executed a note reading “We as Trustees but not
individually promise to pay,” signed by themselves “Trustees;” and
it is ruled, in the words of the syllabus in Hussey v. Arnold, “No
action can be maintained against trustees, holding the property of
an unincorporated association, on a contract made by them which
by its terms is enforceable only against the property held in trust.”
This has been more recently affirmed.”
Upon the stationery of the Massachusetts Gas Companies, printed
in red ink, there appears the following, “The name ‘Massachusetts
Gas Companies is the designation of the Trustees for the time
being under an agreement and declaration of trust, dated 1902, and
a
ll persons dealing with the Massachusetts Gas Companies must
look solely to the Trust property for the enforcement o
f any claim
against the Companies, as neither the Trustees, Officers nor share
holders assume any personal liability for obligations entered into
on behalf o
f
the Companies.” In the Old South Building Trust
deed it is provided that “In every written order, contract or obliga
tion which the Trustees shall give, authorize o
r
enter into, it shall
b
e the duty o
f
the Trustees to stipulate o
r
cause to be stipulated that
neither the Trustees nor shareholders shall be held to any personal
liability under o
r b
y
reason o
f
such order, contract o
r obligation.”
In some of the older cases the exemption of the trustee from per
sonal liability was placed upon the right o
f subrogation o
f
the
creditor to the trustees right o
f indemnity, and to that alone; so
that if the trust estate was insolvent, or the trustee exceeded his
* 123 Mass. 148 (1877).
* 185 Mass. 202 (1904).
* King v. Stowell (1912) 211 Mass. 246, 251.
* Sears, Trust Estates etc., p. 320.
* Conyngton, Corporate Organization, pp. 548, 556.
authority the trustee was still personally liable. Perhaps he still is
in the latter case, but not in the former.”
But how about the liability of the beneficiaries? This depends
apparently upon whether they are really and truly, and individually,
beneficiaries only, of an existing trust, or whether they are assoc
ciated together in such a way as in fact to be partners engaged in
business for profit, the trustees being not really the owners of the
property, but in substance and truth the agents of the associated
beneficiaries. There has been much consideration given to these
matters in Massachusetts.
In Hoadley v. Commrs,” the question was whether transferable
shares in a trust were taxable as corporate shares would be, i.e., at
the domicile of the owner, or where the trust property was located.
Held, the latter, since they were shares in a partnership. Here the
parties had “associated themselves to hold property and carry on
business,” “as the McKay Sewing Machine Association,” but no
member was to have any power to make any contract or transact
any business for the Association, which was itself to be the equit
able owner, and “the general management of the business” was
“vested in an executive committee * * * to be chosen by the
whole body of shareholders at a meeting called by the trustee for
that purpose.”
-
In Gleason v. McKay,” the same Association was involved, and
the question was whether the Association should be taxed upon all
its outstanding shares, as corporations were taxed. It was held not,
on the ground it was a partnership, without any corporate franchise,
and so not subject to the tax.
In Whitman v. Porter,” subscribers associated themselves to
gether to buy a ferry boat to be conveyed to one in trust, to be
managed by trustees and officers elected annually by subscribers,
who were to have transferable shares for their interests in the
“Agawam Ferry Co.;" the plaintiff in the case was one of the share
holders, who had advanced money to pay notes given for the pur
chase of the boat and to pay expenses and asked for contribution
from the others, over and above their subscriptions to pay the
amount due. Held, it was substantially a partnership, and “as
between themselves they were ultimately liable in proportion to their
interests. But as to creditors, each was liable for the whole.”
* Sears, Trust Estates, p. 4o et seq.; Loring, Trustees Handbook, p. 35.
* 105 Mass. 519 (1870).
* 134 Mass. 419 (1883).
* 107 Mass. 522 (1871).
In Phillips v. Blatchford,” money was raised to carry on the
business of manufacturing grates, by sale of transferable certificates
under deed of trust providing the business was to be carried on by
a board of managers of whom the trustee was one, and the others
were to be elected by the shareholders. Held to be a partnership.
In Ricker V. Am. Loan & Trust Co.,” another tax case, it was
held that where those who provided the money for purchasing and
selling cars, to be paid for in ten payments with six per cent interest,
were declared to be an Association with the interests represented
by transferable shares, the business to be managed by a board of
managers named, subject to removal by the shareholders and others
to be elected by them, the title of the property being taken in in
trust by an incorporated trust company, a partnership was created,
subject to taxation as other partnerships.
So too, in William v. Boston,” where a trust was organized to
purchase the site of the Museum of Fine Arts, to be held by trustees,
who should issue transferable shares to the subscribers, in whom
in meeting assembled, was vested the power to instruct the trustees
or remove them, and to alter or amend the declaration of trust, and
to direct the trustees to sell the property, and although the deed
specifically stated that neither the shareholders nor the trustees were
to be personally liable for any obligations of the Trust, yet it was
stated that a partnership for taxation purposes was created. In
the later case of Williams v. Milton (infra) it was said this was a
mistake, it was a trust and not a partnership.
On the other hand in Mayo v. Moritz,” an inventor transferred
his invention to trustees, who were to issue to him one-half of a
specified amount of scrip or transferable shares, the other half to
be issued to subscribers who should furnish the trustees with money
for carrying on the business. The Trustees were to hold, manage
and dispose of the invention, as they thought best, and vacancies
among trustees were to be filled by the remaining trustees, held this
did not constitute a partnership.
The same view is taken in the still more recent case of JWilliams
v. Milton.” This is also a taxation case. The Massachusetts
statute provides that personal property held in trust, shall be taxed
to the trustee where the beneficiary resides; and partners shall be
jointly taxed in the firm name, where the business is done; the
** 137 Mass. 510 (1884).
* 14o Mass. 346 (1885).
* 208 Mass. 497 (1911).
* 151 Mass. 481 (1890).
* 215 Mass. 1 (1913).
business was done in Boston which sought to tax the Trust: as a
partnership doing business there.
The trust deed creating this Boston Personal Property Trust,
“expressly declared that a trust, and not a partnership is hereby
created; that neither the Trustees nor the cestuis que trustent shall
ever be personally liable hereunder as partners or otherwise, but
that for all debts the Trustees shall be liable as such to the extent
of the Trust Fund only. In all contracts or instruments creating
liability it shall be expressly stipulated that the cestuis que trustent
shall not be liable.”
"The Trustees shall have as full power and discretion, as if abso
lute owners, to invest and reinvest the Trust Fund, in personal
property,” to borrow money to extent of 25 per cent of property and
pledge as collateral security any personal property belonging to the
Trust Fund; to declare dividends in their discretion; to render an
annual account; to resign,—vacancies to be filled by remaining
trustees; to issue transferable certificates; to alter, add to or termin
ate the trust with the consent of three-fourths in interest of the
cestuis que trustent.
The court by LoR11~:o, _I.
,
said: “VVhere persons associate them
selves together to carry on business for their mutual profit, they are
none the less partners because (I) their shares in the partnership
are represented by certificates which are transferable and transmis
sible, and because (2) as a matter of convenience (if not of neces
sity in case of transferable and transmissible certificates) the legal
title to the partnership property is taken in the name of a third
person. The person in whose name the partnership property stands
in such a case is perhaps in a sense a trustee. But speaking with
accuracy he is an agent who for the principal’s convenience holds
the legal title to the principal’s property.
After reviewing the Massachusetts cases above referred to, the
court points out that the difference between the partnership cases,
(the Hoadley, lVhitman, Gleason, Phillips, Ricker and Williams
cases), on one hand and Mayo v. Moritz (the patent case) on the
other, lies in the fact that in the former cases the certificate holders
are associated together by the terms of the “trust” and are the
principals whose instructions are to be obeyed by their agent who
for their convenience holds the legal title to their property. The
property is their property. They are the masters. \Vhile in Mayo
v. Morits on the other hand there is no association between the cer
tificate holders. The property is the property of the trustees and the
trustees are the masters. All that the certificate holders in lllayo
v. Moritz had, was a right to have the property managed by the
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trustees for their benefit. They had no right to manage it themselves
nor to instruct the trustees how to manage it for them.” The court
emphasizes that the only power the shareholders had was to consent
to an alteration of the trust deed, but they had no power to direct
or force the trustees to take any action. “It is the trustees, not the
certificate holders, who are the masters of the trust property.”
Similar or even more liberal views have been taken by other
courts. The leading case on what constitutes a partnership is Co."
v. Hickman, decided by the House of Lords in 1860.” In this case
failing merchants assigned all their assets to trustees to carry on the
business under the name of the company, for the benefit of creditors,
with their consent, the deed of trust authorizing the creditors to
accept the resignation of the trustees, appoint new ones, alter the
trusts or direct the business to be discontinued. The trustees in
curred liabilities. Held the trustees were not the agents of the
creditors, and they were not liable as partners. There was perhaps
no association here, although something like a composition among
the creditors.
Very similar to the facts of Co. v. Hickman, is the well con
sidered case of Wells-Stone Mercantile Co. v. Grover. Here by
a deed of trust made by a debtor to a trustee the latter was to convert
the property into money to pay the debtor's debts, make new pur
chases and carry on the business if he thought best. The creditors
consented to this. The creditors were sued by plaintiff for goods
sold to the trustee because he was authorized to make such pur
chases to keep up the stock. It was held, on demurrer, that neither
the original debtor, nor the creditors were liable because no power of
control was reserved over the trustee, and he was not the agent of
the debtor nor the creditors. The trustee and the estate only were
liable.
In the English case of Smith v. Anderson,” a deed of trust was
made between six persons as trustees and another who covenanted
for and on behalf of certain certificate holders, numbering over 20,
who had subscribed for the purchase by the trustees of various
shares in other companies, all of which had been transferred to the
trustees, who were to issue transferable certificates therefor, upon.
which 6 per cent interest was to be paid from profits; the trustees
were to make and change investments, if authorized by certificate
holders, who were to have an annual meeting to hear reports and
* 8 H. L. Cas. 268, 19 Eng. Rul. Cas. 323.
* 7 N. D. 460 (1898), 41 L. R. A. 252, 75 N. W. 914. See also Wells-Stone Mer
cantile Co. v. Aultman (1900) 9 N. D. 520.
* 15 Ch. D. 247 (1880).
elect new trustees. Held there was no partnership, and the com
pany was not illegal because it had not organized under the English
Companies, act, which required every “company, association or
partnership” carrying on business for gain by such company, asso
ciation, or partnership, or by the individual members thereof, when
they exceed 20 in number, to be registered. Held, it was not a
partnership or company that required registration, and that the
trustees were not agents of the shareholders, and that it was the
trustees and not the shareholders who carried on the business.
The case of Johnson v. Lewis” was similar. The trust deed of
1873, was made between parties of the first part styled the trus
tees,” others of second part called “the Committee,” and others of
third part called “covenantees,” these latter were subscribers to a
fund to purchase municipal bonds, to be purchased by the committee,
and put into hands of the trustees in trust to manage. The sub
scribers were to receive transferable certificates for their interests.
The court by CALDwELL, J.
,
held: the trustees were the legal owners
o
f
the trust property and the business o
f
the trust was managed by
them; and the committee created b
y
the deed for the benefit o
f
the
certificate holders were strangers to each other and entered into
n
o
contract between themselves, nor with any trustee o
n
behalf
o
f
each other, and they were not therefore partners.
The Court o
f Appeals o
f
New York have just recently held the
same way, in the case o
f
Jones v. Gould.” Here Gould and two
others were to purchase a line o
f railroad, extend the same, and
build another to coal lands to b
e purchased by them; they were to do
all acts necessary to construct o
r purchase said properties, and for
that purpose absolutely to control the property so to be constructed
o
r purchased as fully in all respects as if they were the absolute
owners thereof. The enumeration o
f
the specific powers was not
to be construed as limiting the general powers conferred upon the
managers. By the agreement the defendants (Gould et al.) con
tracted to purchase the properties on such terms a
s they thought
the best obtainable, and, on the other hand, the subscribers agreed
with each other and with the defendants (Gould et al.) to pay the
amounts o
f
their respective subscriptions from time to time a
s
called for b
y
the latter, but they were to be liable only to defendants,
and then only to the amount o
f
the subscription.
The court per curiam held, “We are o
f
the opinion that under the
syndicate agreement the relation between the subscribers and the
* 6 Fed. 27 (1880).
* 209 N. Y. 419, 103 N. E. 720 (1913).
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managers (the defendants, appellant) was not that of principal and
agent (though doubtless fiduciary) but that the managers them
selves became the principals in any contract which they might make."
There are many other cases to like effect. It seems therefore that
the usual personal liability of the trustees can be excluded by ex
press provision brought home to every one dealt with; the cestuis
que trust, are not partners if the ownership and control of the fund
are left with the trustees; and by express provision brought home
to a dealer the Trust Fund alone can be made liable for the obliga
tions of the trust.
I have‘ referred to the provisions relating to capital stock of a
corporation, and pointed out some of the discordant theories in
reference thereto. It has been, in the main, a struggle between
persons on the one hand who have wished to capitalize visionary
prospective profits before their dreams were in fact realized, and if
disaster came, to get out from under, with some one else in posses
sion of the hot air bag,“ and the State's effort on the other hand to
make the actual capital, in the beginning come up to the manifesto,
or supplement this by other liabilities that frequently work unneces
sary hardship upon honest businessf“ It certainly cannot be said
that the schemes so far devised have been satisfactory. Upon the
one hand they have been insulficient to accomplish their real purpose;
and upon the other, have been too infiexible and inelastic to en
courage. honorable and legitimate enterprise. The careful investor
in shares has difficulty to ascertain from statements of capital stock
much that aids him in getting at real values, while the careless one
is almost certain to be misled. The creditor also is in much the
same predicament. The really careful investor or creditor, relies
not upon the capital stock statements but upon the actual property
and course of business of the particular institution?‘“ The Trust
for the most part proceeds upon a like theory. If one deals with
a Trust in reference to the Trust, it is made his duty in the absence of
express provisions otherwise. and if he has notice that he must look
to the Trust property alone for security, to ascertain just what that
property is, without regard to any amount of nominal shares that
may be issued against it?“ In other words the shares, few or many,
have nothing particularly to do with the property, but are only the
4""See dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Fuller in Handley v. Stutz (1891) 139
U. S. 417, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1923, 1932.
*"Machen, A. W., "Do Corporation laws allow sufiicient freedom to commercial
enterprise?" Maryland Bar Ass’n Report, 1909, pp. 78-98.
“See Cook, Corporations, 7th Ed. §§ 46-47.
"Kisch v. Tozier (1894) 143 N. Y. 390, 42 Am. St. R. 729, note 733.
#
*
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:
method of indicating aliquot parts of the fund for the convenience
of the owners. The investor and the creditor both are expected to
act as business men do, and are required to do, when they are deal
ing with individuals, that is
,
rely upon their own investigation,
knowledge and judgment.
Different people will take different views as to the best policy,
in this regard." Recently New York has provided for the issue of
corporate shares without par value, and has recognized the duty o
f
investor and creditor alike to rely upon his own judgment, instead
o
f upon the uncertain meaning o
f
a fixed capital stock.” The
efficiency and validity o
f
blue sky laws are yet “in nubibus,” and
make corporate capitalization still more intricate,—and cloudy.”
While the right o
f inspecting corporate books b
y
shareholders is
now generally recognized, without any actual controversy being in
volved, such right, in the case o
f Trusts, can be fully recognized o
r
regulated b
y
the trust deed provisions, as the stautory o
r
common
law rules permit in the case o
f corporations.
In an article in the Atlantic Monthly, a short time ago, Mr.
F. L. STETSON, mentioned various disadvantages o
f corporations:
There are, said he (1) Taxation,—organization tax, franchise o
r
continuing tax, property tax, transfer tax, foreign state tax, and
Federal tax, nearly all o
f
which are now imposed upon corporations,
and in addition thereto the shares o
f
shareholders are frequently
taxed to the owner, if not in the creating state, certainly to him
when he lives in another state.” So, too, the franchise tax may be
imposed a
t home, and another privilege tax in each o
f
the states
where the corporation does business, and these may be and fre
quently are higher than domestic corporations in the same business
pay, for a corporation does business, other than interstate com
merce, in a foreign state by sufferance, comity a
s it is called,—
rather than b
y right.” Property of course is taxed wherever it is
,
* See Burton, T. E., Corporations and the State (1911); Stock Watering, W. Z.
Ripley, 2
6
Pol. Sci. Q. 98-121 (1911); Capital o
f Corporations, G
.
W. Wickercham, 22
Harv. Law Rev. 319-338 (1909); Overcapitalization, 38 Natl. Corp. Rep. 5
9 (1909);
Stockwatering, 1
2
Bench and Bar, 4
3 (1908); Williams v
.
McClave (1914) 148 N. Y.
S
.
93.
* Shares Without Nominal or Par Value, Victor Morawetz, 26 Harv. Law Rev.
729 (1913).
*
* Blue Sky Laws, F. A. Updike, 7 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 230-237 (1913); Alabama
& N. O. Transp. Co. et al. v. Doyle (1914) 21o Fed. 173.
* 11o Atl. Monthly, p. 27 et seq. (1912), July).
* 2 Wilgus, Cases, pp. 1370-1391; Farrington v. Tennessee (1877) 95 U. S. 679, 2
Wilgus, Cases, 1370.
*Bank of Augusta v. Earle (1839) 13 Pet. (38 U. S.) 519, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1480;
Manchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Herriott (1899) 91 Fed. 711, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1498, note
1502.
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but here the fiction that personal property follows the owner, is
often applied much more rigorously to corporations than to indi
viduals. Shares are also subject to an inheritance tax, in the state
where the deceased lived, in the state where the corporation is in
corporated, and according to some decisions also where the shares
are to be transferred. The transfer tax can be imposed wherever
the transfer is to be made?” The Federal tax is now an income
tax, and of course would apply to the income of a Trust as well as
a corporation. The Supreme Court however held that the income
tax of 1909, applied only to such associations “as are organized
under some statute, or derive from that source some quality or
benefit not existing at the common law,” and Trusts were not so
organized and have no such quality.“ In Massacliusetts after much
variety of opinion, the Supreme Judicial Court has finally ruled that
these institutions can be subjected to an excise tax under their
constitution, similar to corporations?" Trust property is usually
taxed only to the trustee, who may indemnify himself out of the
trust estate.
:
Mr. STF.Ts0N points out also (2) that corporations are not protect
ed under the 4th and 5th amendments as natural persons are, with
special reference to divulging incriminating information, discrimina
tion against them, as to terms of doing business, and enforcing
claims. So also under the reserved power to repeal or amend cor
porate charters, many limitations and restrictions upon a corpora
tion’s power to contract can be and are imposed that would not be
valid if imposed upon citizens of the United States?" So a foreign
corporation as a creditor, unless it has entered a state and complied
with its laws in reference to doing business in the state, is not a
person within the jurisdiction, so as to be protected under the
m Morrison v. Manchester (1879) 58 N. H. 538; -Fowler v. Campbell 100 Mich.
398; City of Detroit v. Lewis, 109 Mich. 155, 32 L. R. A. 439; Mills v. Thornton, 26
Ill. 300, 79 Am. Dee. 377; Matzenbaugh v. People, 194 Ill. 108, 88 Am. St. R. 134;
Latrobe v. Mayor, 19 Md. 13; Corry v. Baltimore, 96 Md. 310, 196 U. S. 466, 25 S. C.
297; Tappan v. Merchants’ Bank, 19 Wall (U. S.) 490; Merriman's Estate, 147 Mich.
630; Estate of Palmer, 183 N. Y. 238; In re Ames Estate (1913) 141 N. Y. S. 793:
People v. Union Trust Co., 255 Ill. 168; Matter of Cooley, 186 N. Y. 220.
*7’Eliot v. Freeman (1911) 220 U. S. 178.
*7‘In re Opinion of Justices (1908) 195 Mass. 607, 84 N. E. 490; In re Opinion of
Justices (1911) 208 Mass. 616, 94 N. E. 1043; Compare S. S. White Dental Mfg. Co. v.
Co1nmw. (1912) 212 Mass. 35, 98 N. E. 1056 (Corp.); Keystone Watch Co. v. Commw.
(1912) 212 Mass. 50, 98 N. E. 1063 (Corp.); Farr Alpaca Co. v. Commw. (1912) 212
Mass. 156, 98 N. E. 1078 (Corp.); Baltic Min. Co. v. Commw. (1913) 231 U. S. 68,
34 S. C. 15.
':"State v. Nashville etc. Ry. Co. (1911) 124 Tenn. 1, 135 S. W. 773, Ann. Cas. 1912
D. 805; Hale v. Henkel (1906) 201 U. S. 43; Wilson v. U. S. (1911) 221 U. S. 361;
McGuire v. Railway C0. (1906) 131 Ia. 340.
\
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clause that says “no state shall deny to any person within it
s juris
diction the equal protection o
f
the laws.” In almost all these
particulars, trustees being citizens o
f
the United States and entitled
to all the privileges and immunities o
f
citizens in the several states,
would be protected more fully than a corporation.” So too many
states attempt to exclude corporations doing business in the state
from suing in the Federal courts, and while they cannot actually
exclude them from the Federal Courts, they may oust the offending
corporation from the state.”
Mr. STETSON also points out (3) the very great and unjust toll that
is paid b
y corporations in litigation because o
f prejudice against
them, exhibited b
y juries and legislators. In some degree at least this
would be less pronounced in the case o
f
a Trust, where responsible
local citizens o
f standing were the trustees.
Upon the public side it was noted in the beginning that one o
f
the
crying weaknesses o
f corporations was the impersonal character, and
the lack o
f
individual personal responsibility, especially toward the
public, that characterized it
,
and its actions. It might seem that
here the Trust would be superior; and it is more than probable that
so far as the relation o
f
the Trustee toward the beneficiaries, is
concerned, there is under the rules o
f
courts o
f Equity, a much more
positive and direct feeling o
f personal responsibility.
Toward the public, however, this may be doubted, for we have the
experience that all o
f
our great industrial combinations, good and
bad, have almost without exception originated a
s Trusts, under
Trust deeds such as we have been describing;” and from this form,
held b
y
the New York Court of Appeals, in the Sugar Trust” case
to be illegal as a partnership contrary to the right o
f
a corporation
to be a member o
f such, and by the Supreme Court o
f
Ohio in the
Standard Oil Case to be an institution in unlawful restraint of
trade,” those who then saw the handwriting on the wall fled in
hope to find legal shelter in the corporate form, only to find their
* Blake v. McClung (1900) 176 U. S. 59, 2 Wilgus, 'Cases, 2045; (1898) 172 U. S.
239, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 2036.
* Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co. (1886) 27 Fed. 146; Roby
v
.
Smith (1891) 131 Ind. 342, 2
0
N. E
. 1093; Sears, Trust Estates etc., 194.
* Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co. (1876) 94 U. S. 535, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1491;
Harrison v
.
St. Louis & S
.
F. R
.
Co. (1914) — U. S. —, 34 S. C
.
333.
* See 1 Wilgus, Cases, pp. 957-984. See cases in 212 Mass., and 231 U. S. in
note 274 above
* People v. North River Sugar Ref. Co. (1890) 121 N. Y. 582, 1 Wilgus, Cases,
100, note 109.
* State v. Standard Oil Co. (1892) 49 O. S. 137, 34 Am. St. R. 541.
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hope in vain.” Neither trust nor corporate form where restraint
of trade is the end of the organization, can stand the searching
power of the government to destroy either under the common law
or under the anti-trust acts.”
Massachusetts has through Commissioners made investigations of
these Express Trusts, and after two reports, enacted legislation pro
viding for the filing with the Railroad Commission of al
l
deeds o
f
trust for such Associations, and in the case o
f
Trusts for owning
shares in railway, street railway and electric railway companies, o
r
which are managed b
y
the same parties, making annual reports to,
and making them subject to examination by, the Railroad Commis
sion. The same power is given also to the Gas Commission in
reference to gas, electric light, and power companies.
If the foregoing review is accurate, it would seem that, largely
because o
f
the variety, uncertainty, and confusion arising from con
flicting legislative provisions, the Trust form o
f organization, at
least upon the private side, is more simple, certain, consistent and
yet flexible, and perhaps with even more satisfactory safeguards
available both to the investor and the creditor, than is the corpora
tion.
Upon the public side, however, so far as control is concerned, the
State can reach a
n offending corporation more directly and posi
tively, notwithstanding the Trust form o
f organization was
abandoned for the corporate form, with the belief that in that way
anti-trust laws could be evaded.
So far as any feeling o
f
direct personal responsibility toward the
public as a whole is concerned, there does not seem to be much
difference. The psychology o
f
the group mind seems to be inherently
different from that o
f
a single individual. It will seek and accomp
lish ends from which individuals will shrink. As the non-explosives,
glycerine, nitric and sulphuric acids and saw-dust mixed, make the
explosive dynamite, so does the combination o
f
the intelligent, the
stupid, the selfish and unselfish, the honest and the dishonest, into
one group, give a resultant that when quiescent usually does much
better than the worst, yet from hidden powers often does much
worse than the worst." Undoubtedly much could be done to make
* Distilling & Cattle Feeding Co. v. People (1895) 156 Ill. 448, 1 Wilgus, Cases,
978.
* Northern Securities Co. v. U. S. (1903) 193 U. S. 200; Standard Oil Co. v.
U. S
.
(1910) 221 U. S. 1
;
U. S. v. Am. Tobacco Co. (1910) 221 U. S. 106.
* See chapters 454, 509, and 596 of Public Acts of 1913.
* Distilling and Cattle Feeding Co. v. People (1895) 156 Ill. 448, 47 Am. St. R.
1 Wilgus, Cases, 978.
* LeBon, The Crowd, pp. 2-44.
our corporation laws, more simple, certain and flexible; and a
properly worked out Federal incorporation law would help corpora
tions with extensive business in many respects, and furnish a model
for state legislation.
\V hen laws are uncertain, or unduly hamper legitimate enterprise,
bright minds will invent methods to accomplish unexpected ends.
In the early years of our history, there was great prejudice against
the incorporation of banks, and there were either no laws permi-tting
it or if there were any, they were such as were difificult to comply
with. The brilliant services of Alexander Hamilton, and of Aaron
Burr were called in requisition to devise plans for the institution of
banks in New York City. Hamilton drew up a masterly paper which
with a few words changed—directors to trustees, shareholders to
beneficiaries, and a few others, would still be a model form for a
Trust for business purposes, such as we have been considering, and
which was the constitution of the Merchants Bank for 20 years, until
the legislature forbade banking in any but the corporation form.
On the other hand Aaron Burr engineered a bill through the New
York legislature to incorporate a company to supply the city of New
York with water, and with authority to use its surplus capital “in
any way not inconsistent with the laws and constitutions of the
United States and New York.” Under this charter, so it is stated,
the Manhattan Bank has been carrying on business for I15 years?“
These perhaps are typical illustrations as to what lawyers are
called upon to‘ do, and the methods sometimes resorted to. The one
statesman-like, constructive, and within the law. The other un
statesman-like, destructive, and if within the law at all, only so by
taking advantage of its uncertainty, to thwart the expressed will of
the people.
Perhaps these things can never be wholly overcome until men are
made over. All production is the result of the combination of forces
within man, with forces and ‘things outside him, of persons and
property. From the beginning of time some men in whom the
sense of brotherhood was latent or unborn. have always classed
other men as external things to be used or exploited as other
property, and have considered it proper to take all that their
strength, their wit or their cunning enabled them to take; others
have believed that they should take no more from the common
fund than they had contributed to it; still others that they should
contribute to it all their ability and their skill would enable them to
'-*"Hamilton's \Vorks, vol. 7, pp. 838-844; Scars, Trust Estates, etc., p. 341.
""“Century Magazine, May, 1899; Parton's Life of Burr, p. 238.
do, and take from it only what they needed. There is no doubt but
that the trend of the ages has been practically from the first of these
toward the second, and perhaps in the more recent years of the
Christian era, there has been a trend ideally at least, if not much
practically, toward the third. As one or the other of these ends
are dominant so will the nature and the administration of the laws
be. And so will the institutions founded upon them be. But none
will be perfect until men are perfect.
H. L. WILGUs.
University of Michigan.
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